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WHY SHOULDN'T ATTORNEYS BE ALLOWED TO VIEW
METADATA?: A PROPOSAL FOR ALLOWING ATTORNEYS
TO VIEW METADATA AS LONG AS EXTRAORDINARY
MEASURES ARE NOT TAKEN TO DO SO AND OPPOSING
COUNSEL IS CONTACTED UPON DISCOVERY OF
SENSITIVE INFORMATION
Michael W. Loudenslager*
The existence of metadata is an unavoidable aspect of rapidly
changing technologies and information data processing tools.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An attorney has been negotiating a commercial lease on behalf of a
client who wants to open a clothing store in a shopping center. The
attorney receives an e-mail message from opposing counsel who
represents the company that runs the shopping center. Included as an
attachment to the e-mail is a draft of the proposed lease agreement
between the two parties. In the past, opposing counsel has included
comments about changes made to the lease that present explanations or
arguments for changes made within the document by using the
"Comments" function in Microsoft Word which provides "bubbles"
connected by lines to specific portions of the text.2 The receiving
attorney enables in Microsoft Word the "Comments" function.
Upon reviewing such "Comments," the receiving attorney discovers
one attached to the clause dealing with the amount of monthly rental
payments that states, "I absolutely cannot go below $2,500 per month."
The attorney places the computer cursor over this comment, and this
indicates that the president of the company leasing out the space made
this comment. The attorney finds this interesting because opposing
counsel has maintained that his client wants at least three thousand five
2. For a more extensive explanation of the "Comments" word processing function, see
infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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hundred dollars ($3,500) per month for the space being bargained over.
Further reading of the document reveals another comment connected to
a provision prohibiting the lessee from displaying a sign of a proscribed
size outside of the store stating, "I know that they like to keep a uniform
look throughout the shopping center, but my investigation of the facts
and law indicates that a court may not enforce this." Placing the
computer cursor over this comment reveals that another attorney in
opposing counsel's law firm made this comment. This information is
helpful to the receiving attorney because her client has expressed a
desire to post a large sign outside the store, and opposing counsel had
stated that the lessor might require a higher rent if her client was going
to exceed the size limitations normally set out in the shopping center
leases.
The receiving attorney's conduct to this point raises several
potentially thorny ethical questions. To start, has the receiving attorney
acted unethically by accessing the information left presumably
inadvertently by opposing counsel in the "Comments" bubbles of the
draft lease agreement? Ethics panels in various U.S. jurisdictions, as
well as that of the American Bar Association, have come to differing
conclusions on this issue. Must the receiving attorney notify opposing
counsel of her discovery of this information in the "Comments" of the
electronic document? According to the language of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, it appears that she does, as long as she should
reasonably conclude that the sending attorney included such
information inadvertently.3 Lastly, by including this information in the
"Comments" bubbles that the receiving attorney accessed after enabling
this word processing function, has the sending attorney waived any
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection for the
information?4 The answer to this question is arguably yes, although the
author is unaware of any court cases directly addressing this issue as of
the time of the writing of this Article.
This Article deals with the issue of receiving attorneys viewing what
is termed the "metadata" of electronic documents transmitted by
opposing counsel outside the context of litigation. Thus, the Article
deals mainly with the ethical duties of attorneys who examine the
metadata contained in agreements that parties are in the process of
negotiating and are transmitted between party attorneys in electronic
form. The Article concludes that receiving attorneys, in fact, should be
allowed to view such metadata as long as the attorney does not take
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.

org/cpr/nrpc/rule_4_4.html.
4. To see the various ways courts have dealt with the issue of "unringing the bell" after
inadvertent disclosure, see Lawyer's Duty Under Model Rule 4.4(B): Notify the Sender,
http://www.abanet.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
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extraordinary measures to retrieve information that the sending attorney
took affirmative action to remove or delete prior to transmission of the
document. However, the Article decides that once a receiving attorney
discovers sensitive information in the metadata that the attorney should
know was included inadvertently, the receiving attorney has a duty to
inform the sending attorney of this discovery. In this manner, the
sending attorney is made aware of the disclosure that has occurred and
may attempt to take protective measures to prevent further disclosure of
the information concerned. Nevertheless, this Article determines that
the inclusion of such information in metadata arguably waives any
applicable attorney-client privilege or work-product protection,
especially if the receiving attorney did not have to use extraordinary
measures to access this information.
This Article reaches these conclusions first by discussing what
metadata is and the available methods for getting rid of metadata from
electronic documents. 5 The Article then discusses the provisions of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct that potentially apply to a
receiving attorney viewing the metadata contained in an electronic
document forwarded by opposing counsel. 6 The Article goes on to
explain the various approaches to the issue that ethics panels have taken
to date. The Article then explains the current state of the law with
regard to when an inadvertent disclosure may waive the attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection and applies this to the inclusion
of such information in the metadata of electronic documents forwarded
to opposing counsel. The Article then presents the arguments for
allowing receiving attorneys to view the metadata of electronic
documents transmitted by opposing counsel as long as the receiving
attorney does not use extraordinary measures in doing so. 9 The Article
ends with a brief conclusion.' 0

II. METADATA:

WHAT IT IS AND METHODS OF GETTING RID OF IT

Metadata has been described as "data about data."" Metadata
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra PartV.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See infra Part VII.
11. David Hricik, I Can Tell When You're Telling Lies: Ethics and Embedded
Confidential Information, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 79, 81 (2006); Adam K. Israel, Note, To Scrub or
Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of Metadata and ElectronicData Creation,Exchange,
and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. REv. 469, 469 (2009); Campbell C. Steele, Note, Attorneys Beware:
Metadata'sImpact on Privilege,Work Product, and the EthicalRules, 35 U. MEM. L. REv. 911,

2010]

WHY SHOULDN'TATTORNEYS BE ALLOWED TO VIEW METADATA?: A PROPOSAL

163

generally consists of data that computer word processing software
creates in order for users to be able to access, store, and revise
electronic documents.1 2 An author's name, the owner of the word
processing software, the date on which the author created the document
concerned, the date on which the document was last edited, and the file
name of the document are examples of metadata that an electronic
document can contain. 13 In fact, metadata may include the names of
every person whose computer has accessed the document.14 The word
processing program itself creates this type of metadata automatically
without the author of the document having to take any affirmative
action.' 5 Thus, an author of an electronic document may not be aware
that someone else who receives a copy of the electronic document can
access this type of information.
935 (2005).
12. Hricik, supra note 11, at 83 ("[Tjhe primary function of embedded data is utilitarian:
it is designed to help users of software, revise, organize, and access electronically-created
files."); Israel, supra note 11, at 472 ("Metadata is important for efficient 'editing, viewing,
filing and retrieval' of documents."); David Hricik & Robert J. Jueneman, The Transmission
and Receipt ofInvisible ConfidentialInformation, 15 PROF. LAW. 18, 20 (2004) ("[M]etadata in
the form of title, subject, keywords, author, company, and many other such information are
included either to make the storing and retrieving of such documents in a large organization
more feasible, and/or to simplify the editing and production of those documents.").
13. Elizabeth W. King, The Ethics of Miningfor Metadata Outside of Formal Discovery,
113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 801, 805 (2009) ("Automatically-created metadata includes the name of
the author of the document, the date on which the document was created and last edited, where
the document was stored, and numerous other pieces of technical information."); Hricik, supra
note 11, at 83 ("Typical metadata includes, for example, the person who authored the document
and its location (drive, folder)," and in Microsoft Word, "[tihe 'Properties' [menu] for a
particular document can reveal the author, creation dates, and other information."); Israel, supra
note 11, at 469 ("[M]etadata often reports the author's name and initials; the name of the
company or organization where the document was created; the name of the author's computer;
the name of the server or network on which the document was saved; the names of previous
document authors ... ."); Jason Krause, Hidden Agendas: Unlocking Invisible Electronic Codes
Can Reveal Deleted Text, Revisions, A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (July 2004).,("[M]etadata: [is] invisible
data embedded in a computer file that contains information about the file itself, such as when
the document was created, who created it or when it was last modified."); Eileen B. Libby, What
Lurks Within: Hidden Metadata in Electronic Documents Can Win or Lose Your Case, April
2007, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/about/HiddenMetadata.html ("File system metadata created
by programs such as Word and Excel can include the following: file name, original author,
information regarding by whom and when revisions were made, number of pages, number of
characters, file size, date created, date modified, and date printed.").
14. King, supra note 13, at 806 ("In law firms, where multiple versions of documents are
created during the drafting process, it may be possible to find out the names of all persons who
have accessed the document, viewed the document, made revisions, printed the document, and
the dates of each access to the document."); Peter Mierzwa, Metadata:Now You Don 't See ItNow You Do, 20 CHI. B. Ass'N REcoRD 52, 52 (2006). ("Metadata can provide an electronic
paper trail of who touched the document and what they did.").
15. See King, supra note 13, at 805 ("First, metadata is created automatically by software
programs, such as Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel.").
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In addition to the information that computer software automatically
creates, metadata can include "user created" information.' 6 In the
Microsoft Word word processing program, the two most prominent
features that allow authors to create and affirmatively insert metadata
into electronic documents are the "Comments" and "Track Changes"
functions.17 The "Comments" function allows reviewers of a document
to insert little balloons or bubbles into the margin of the document in
order to provide commentary on particular, marked language in the text
of the document.' 8 Moreover, when the computer's cursor passes over a
comment bubble, the program will indicate, unless disabled, the name
of the comment's author and the date and time at which the author
included the comment in the document. However, in order for these
comments to be viewed, someone reading the document must

16. See id. (distinguishing between metadata "created automatically by software
programs" and "[u]ser-created metadata" generated manually by "attorneys working on
documents"); Hricik, supra note 11, at 82 ("In addition to metadata, many software programs
permit authors to '[t]rack [c]hanges' to the text, to save 'multiple undoes' in case the author
decides to 'undo' revisions made previously, and to even overlay hidden comments into the text.
This other information is also embedded with the file and accompanies the file unless removed
prior to transmission.").
17. King, supra note 13, at 806 ("User-created metadata includes metadata that is created
when functions in Microsoft Word, or an equivalent word processing system, are used, such as
track changes and comments.").
18.
A comment is a note inserted into an electronic document about a particular
part, paragraph, or sentence of the document. Word processing programs allow
an attorney to either embed a comment into the document, which requires
someone reading the document to hold the cursor over a certain spot to view
the comment, or the attorney can insert comments into the document so that the
comments appear on the margin of the document and are readily viewable by
other attorneys.
King, supra note 13, at 806-07; Krause, supra note 13, at 27 (describing the "Comments"
function in Microsoft Word as "[a]llow[ing] people viewing a document to make comments that
do not become part of the text"). One commentator describes the usefulness of the Comments
function in the following manner:
Comments are incredibly useful for collaborative preparation of documents.
For example, I am working with a colleague on a book on statutory
interpretation. Each of us can make a comment to the other to explain the
reason for a suggested a [sic] revision, inclusion of a certain concept, or the
need for further clarification on some portion of the book. Those comments are
embedded with the file and accompany it whenever we exchange the file.
Hricik, supra note 11, at 86.
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affirmatively enable the "Comments" function. 19 Otherwise, such
comments will not appear on the computer screen when the reader
opens the document.
The "Track Changes" function allows a reviewer of an electronic
document to see the changes that a previous author made to the
document and decide whether to accept or reject those changes. 20
Similar to the "Comments" function, a viewer of the document must
affirmatively enable the "Track Changes" function in order to see the
changes that have been made to the document after it originally was
created. 2 1 Another function called "Versions" that is perhaps less wellknown allows the user to retrieve all prior versions of an electronic
document created after the user enables the function. 22
Because this second type of "user created" metadata contains
information that the original author of the document and subsequent
19. In order to enable the "Comments" function in Microsoft Word, a reader first must
pull down the "View" tab at the top of the computer screen and choose "Markup." Once the
"Markup" toolbar appears, then the reader must choose "Final Showing Markup" in the
rectangular window on the left of the toolbar. Finally, under "Show" on the toolbar, the reader
must have "Comments" checked.
20. See King, supra note 13, at 806 ("The track changes function allows a user to track or
identify every change-additions, deletions, reorganizations-made to an electronic
document."); Steele, supra note 11, at 937 ("Microsoft Word's 'Track Changes' feature allows
users to insert, delete, and move text and then later accept or reject those changes. As these
changes are made, new revisions of the document are created, with the revision history
remaining even after the user has accepted or rejected the changes."); Krause, supra note 13, at
27 (describing the "Tracks Changes" function in Microsoft Word as "[s]how[ing] changes that
have been made to a document, including text that has been deleted."); Mierzwa, supra note 14,
at 56 ("Track changes allows us to send draft documents for comments to co-counsel, the client,
and even opposing counsel, then review those changes and either accept or reject them.").
"Track Changes" is a feature that creates a record of every change made to a
file. Its many uses include lawyers who exchange drafts of contracts . . . can
turn on track changes so that it is easy to spot revisions made to a proposed
contract during negotiations; word processing personnel may turn on track
changes so that they can review and ensure that they have made each
handwritten edit desired by a lawyer; a co-author can turn on track changes to
monitor edits; and so on.
Hricik, supra note 11, at 85
21. See Hricik, supra note 11, at 85 ("[T]he typical view on the screen of a Word
document does not reveal the tracked changes. The changes will be 'invisible."'). "In order to
turn on track changes, go to the 'Tools' menu and to 'Track Changes.' In order to see whether
an open document contains tracked changes, turn on track changes, and then ensure that you are
viewing the 'Final Showing Markup."' Id. at 85 n.26.
22. See id. at 86 ("If 'Versions' is enabled, then embedded with the file are all prior
versions of the document. Each time it is saved, a new version is created and saved."); Steele,
supra note 11, at 937 ("This feature [Versions] allows users to save multiple versions of a single
document.).
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reviewers add to or change in an electronic document, it has the most
potential to reveal confidential attorney-client communications and
attorney work-product. For example, by viewing comments that a client
has made on the proposed terms of a contract, an opponent might be
able to discern what provisions are of utmost concern to the opposing
client as well as the monetary limits at which the client will agree to
finalize a deal or settle a lawsuit. An opponent might be able to discern
similar information, if not as explicitly, by viewing the modifications
that have been made to the document by enabling the "Track Changes"
function or viewing prior versions of the document if the original user
enabled the "Versions" function. 23
A person can remove metadata in four ways. First, a user can prevent
automatically created metadata by following directions offered by the
publisher of the particular word processing software used and changing
the options and settings on various "pull down" tabs positioned at the
top of the computer screen. 2 4 Similarly, users can remove user-created
23. See King, supra note 13, at 806 ("The attorney who subsequently receives the
document may be able to view the sending attorney's changes, as well as the names of people
who made changes-the metadata-by turning the track changes function on again or using
some other technological means to reveal the metadata."); Hricik, supra note 12, at 85-86
(stating that "[i]f [the document] were a contract, [Track Changes] could reveal to an opposing
party revisions I had made to key terms of the proposed contract" and if an attorney had enabled
"Versions," then opposing counsel "can view every prior version of the document") (alteration
in the original); Steele, supra note 11, at 937 ("The problem [with the 'Versions' function] is
that a subsequent recipient of the document can view any previous versions that have been
saved and see most, if not all, of the changes that have been rendered during the document's
life.").
The danger with "Track Changes" arises when the text is no longer highlighted
but the feature is left on. If the changes are accepted, the final version of the
document shows only a clean, edited version of the document. The history of
those changes remains hidden within the document, however, and any recipient
could look inside that document and view the changes that were made.
Steele, supra note 11, at 937; see also Mierzwa, supra note 14, at 56-57 ("The risk with track
changes is that it can be set to keep changes hidden. With the hidden text option turned on, the
person editing the document can make changes without knowing that those changes and the
original text has been stored.").
24. See Israel, supra note 11, at 474 ("Microsoft has posted several articles detailing stepby-step do-it-yourself metadata removal techniques. These techniques include manually turning
off fast saves, searching for and removing text that is formatted as hidden, and manually
removing comments from a document, among other helpful methods."); Jembaa Cole, When
Invisible Electronic Ink Leaves Red Faces: Tactical, Legal and Ethical Consequences of the
Failure to Remove Metadata, I SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 8 (2005), http://www.lctjournal.
washington.edulVoll/a008Cole.html ("Software options can be modified to reduce the amount
of metadata created and to specify the fields of metadata that should be populated. These
settings can be altered to minimize the amount of data produced. Microsoft publishes step-bystep guides to minimizing metadata fields in software."). See Frank C. Rice, Protecting

2010]

WHY SHOULDN'T ATTORNEYS BE ALLOWED TO VIEW METADATA?: A PROPOSAL

167

metadata by, for example, going back and manually deleting comment
balloons previously included in a document. 2 5 However, manually
removing metadata in this manner or preventing the creation of
metadata through continuously changing preset software settings is a
fairly painstaking and time intensive process. 26
Second, users also can purchase various "scrubber" programs that
remove metadata. 27 A user can run electronic documents through a
scrubber program before sending the document via e-mail to an
opposing party.28 Microsoft itself provides a program to scrub metadata
PersonalData in Your Microsoft Word Documents, Aug. 2002, http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/aal40274(office.10, printer).aspx for directions on how to minimize metadata in

Microsoft Word 2002 documents.
25. Israel, supra note 11, at 474 (stating that "do-it-yourself metadata removal
techniques" include "manually removing comments from a document").
26. Corel also has started providing a version of its word processing program,
WordPerfect, that will not create metadata. Id. ("WordPerfect X3 contains a feature that allows
users to save documents without metadata."); Ellen Freedman et al., The Lawyer's Guide to
Mobile Computer Security, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 2007, available at http://www.osbar.org/
publications/bulletin/07nov/security.htm. ("WordPerfect users might consider upgrading to
version X3 that has a 'save without metadata' feature."). However, the user affirmatively has to
initiate this process. See Israel, supra note 11, at 474-75 ("Therefore, users must be aware of the
feature and save files without metadata on their own initiative, creating the risk that user
oversight will leave metadata intact."). Otherwise, the program will continue to create metadata.
See id. at 474 ("WordPerfect X3 does not automatically prompt users to save without
metadata.").
27. See Cole, supra note 24 ("A metadata scrubber is a computer program that acts as a
filter and strips metadata from documents."); Israel, supra note 11, at 475 ("Scrubbers are
programs developed by legal consulting companies that 'claim [to] have the ability to identify
and eliminate some of the more harmful forms of metadata from documents."'); Libby, supra
note 12 ("There are many ways to clean or 'scrub' documents of embedded hidden data, for
example, programs such as iScrub, 3B Clean, PCG's Metadata Assistant, and Workshare's
Professional 4's 'Hidden Data."'); Mierzwa, supra note 14, at 57 ("Third party products like
Metadata Assistant, iScrub or Change Pro Meta-data Suite allow you to remove metadata from
individual files."). Such programs appear to be fairly inexpensive. For example:
Metadata Assistant, offered by the Payne Consulting Group, which "[flor
Word, Excel and PowerPoint documents[] [is] one of the most widely used
metadata scubbers,' costs $79 per workstation plus an annual maintenance fee
which varies depending on the number of workstations. The licensing fee is a
one-time payment, and there is no minimum number of licenses that must be
purchased. Enterprise licenses, which offer the same protection as the
individual licenses, are available for larger firms at $64 per license; however,
there is a purchase requirement of at least twenty licenses.
Israel, supra note 11, at 475.
28. Israel, supra note 11, at 475 ("Generally, these [scrubber] programs prompt users to
scrub or remove all or part of the metadata contained within a document before it is transmitted
electronically, minimizing the problem of overlooking the existence of metadata."); Sharon D.
Nelson & John W. Simek, Cool Technology for Hot Lawyers, LAw. J., Aug. 17, 2007, at 11 ("If
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from electronic documents.29 While using such programs is more
efficient than going back into an electronic document and manually
removing metadata, such scrubber programs may not remove all types
of metadata.30 Despite this, given the potential for user error in
manually attempting to remove metadata, scrubber programs are a
better choice for removal of metadata if an attorney is worried about
inadvertently disclosing a client's confidential information or attorney
work-product.31
A third option for removing metadata is converting the electronic
document from a Microsoft Word or Word Perfect file to a "portable
document format" (PDF) or a "rich text format" (RTF) file. 32
Converting the document to a PDF file, through manually scanning the
document or through an electronic conversion program, should remove
embedded data created by the "Comments," "Track Changes," and
"Versions" functions.3 3 Therefore, an opponent who subsequently
receives the document would not be able to view the metadata whose
revelation, in most situations, has the greatest potential to harm the
interests of the forwarding attorney's client.
you e-mail a Word document as an attachment, [the scrubber program called] Metadata
Assistant will prompt you to scrub the metadata or send it without cleaning.").
29. Krause, supra note 13, at 26 ("Microsoft also offers a plug-in tool that will strip
metadata from a document, which users can download free from the company's Web site."); but
see Israel, supra note 11, at 474 (noting that the Microsoft "add-in only removes metadata
created by the track changes and comments features.").
30. Hricik, supra note 11, at 94-95 (stating that programs have "add-ons and other utilities
to remove metadata" but that "they require several steps per document, and purportedly not all
embedded data is necessarily scrubbed from the document by taking all of these steps"); Cole,
supra note 24 ("Keep in mind that the scrubber may not remove all metadata.").
31. See Israel, supra note 11, at 475 ("While there may be minor problems associated with
metadata scrubbers, considering the potential for oversight or user error associated with the selfhelp solutions provided by Microsoft and Corel, generally they [scrubbers] are the wisest
investment to minimize the potential consequences posed by inadvertent disclosure of metadata
containing confidential client information."); Cole, supra note 24 ("Although these
[Microsoft's] guides are straight forward, some of the metadata fields are difficult to access; as
such this may not be the best option for effective removal of metadata. A more efficient
alternative is to use a commercial metadata scrubber or document sanitizer.").
32. Krause, supra note 13, at 26 ("Alternatively, Microsoft Word users can easily strip out
much of a document's metadata by saving it in the Rich Text Format, or .rtf. Another way is
simply to send a document as a pdf file, a popular format for legal documents.").
33. Cole, supra note 24 ("One can provide 'clean' electronic documents without using
metadata scrubbers by scanning. Printing will eliminate metadata and the scanned version of the
document will be clean."); Hricik, supra note 11, at 88 ("[A] Word document saved into .pdf
format will no longer carry with it the data embedded by the Word program."); Israel, supra
note 11, at 473 ("First, simply converting a document from its original editable Word or
WordPerfect format to a PDF will reduce some of the more sensitive metadata."); but see
Hricik, supra note 11, at 88 ("[I]f the document is converted into .pdf format in the "View Final
With Markup" setting, then the resulting .pdf document will show the comments and changes.").
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However, similar to scrubber programs, several commentators have
noted that converting word processing files to PDF or RTF will still
leave some metadata. 34 Nevertheless, at least when the original file is
converted to a PDF file, the metadata left should be of the more jeneric
type and not the more sensitive "user-created" information. The
metadata left should consist only of the information that the PDF
software needs to access the document.3 6 Contrastingly, while
converting an electronic document to a RTF file will remove much of
the metadata from the original document, "if the original document had
been created with 'Track Changes' on, the resulting rich text [RTF]
document will continue to reveal tracked changes." 37
Finally, one manner of absolutely ensuring that an opponent does not
become privy to metadata containing attorney-client communications or
attorney work-product would be to forward a hard or paper copy of the
document to the opposing side rather than transmitting the document in
the form of an electronic file.3 8 An attorney could send a hard copy of
the document to the opposing attorney, and still draft, revise and edit,
along with in-house attorneys and even the client, using the
"Comments" and "Track Changes" function. However, at least one
commentator has implied that only transmitting hard copies of
34. Hricik, supra note 11, at 93 ("Saving a document into .pdf format reduces the amount
of metadata but does not eliminate it entirely."); Israel, supra note 11, at 473 ("Unfortunately,
PDF files also contain a healthy amount of metadata."); Steele, supra note 11, at 936 ("Contrary
to popular belief, even Adobe PDF files contain some amount of metadata."); Libby, supranote
13 ("Portable Document Format (PDF) documents also may contain potentially harmful
metadata, although less than in other types of documents.").
35. Israel, supra note 11, at 473 ("First, simply converting a document from its original
editable Word or WordPerfect format to a PDF [file] will reduce some of the more sensitive
metadata."); Freedman et al., supra note 26, at 25 ("Although PDF documents created in this
manner retain some metadata, it is limited and not of the type likely to expose client confidences
or to prove embarrassing.").
36. See Hricik, supra note 11, at 88 (noting that a document converted from Word to a
PDF file "will still contain metadata: however, it will be the metadata created by Adobe
Acrobat, not Word" and that "[t]here is clearly less metadata, but nonetheless the author, the
time of creation, and the time of modification are visible"). Specifically:
PDF files may contain information regarding: Authors, Create Data, Filename,
PDF Version, Page Count, Encryption Status, Permanent ID, Changing ID,
Producer, Creator, Custom Fields, Title, Subject, Keywords, Modification
Date, Bookmarks (total number), Annotations (total number, type and total type
amount), Page One Size, and Font Name, Type, and Embed Status.
Israel, supra note 11, at 473-74.
37. Hricik, supra note 11, at 88-89.
38. See Cole, supra note 24 ("The best way to remove metadata is to convert the
document to a non-electronic format, paper copy."); Mierzwa, supra note 14, at 57 ("Where you
don't have to provide an electronic version faxing or mailing the document is the best option.").
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documents between parties could constitute an undue burden in this da
and age. 39 This also might not be practical under all circumstances.
Nevertheless, several methods exist to eliminate, or at least significantly
reduce, the inclusion of sensitive metadata in electronic documents that
an attorney forwards to opposing counsel.

III. POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Several legal ethics rules potentially apply to the conduct of an
attorney that views metadata in electronic documents transmitted by
opposing counsel. While none of these rules explicitly address this
conduct, the most applicable rule appears to require that the receiving
attorney at least inform the sending attorney of the discovery of
sensitive information in metadata when the receiving attorney
reasonably should realize that such information was inadvertently
included in the metadata concerned. While some ethics panels have
applied other legal ethics rules to the question of whether a receiving
attorney should view metadata in electronic documents, the applicability
of these rules is questionable at best. However, a complete discussion of
this issue necessitates an examination of all potentially applicable legal
ethics provisions.
A. Model Rule 4.4(b) Respectfor Rights of Third Persons
Model Rule 4.4 is entitled "Respect for Rights of Third Persons."Al
Section (b) of the rule states that "[a] lawyer who receives a document
relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or
reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall
promptly notify the sender."4 2 The comment to the rule in paragraph
two defines the term "document" to include "e-mail or other electronic
modes of transmission subject to being read or put into readable
form." 43 Moreover, the comment further states that "[i]f a lawyer knows
39. King, supra note 13, at 830 ("Requiring attorneys to avoid creating metadata in the
first place would require them to take a step backward in time and would decrease productivity
and increase client expense" and "[r]equiring attorneys to hand deliver documents, or use image
formats or fax machines to transmit documents would likewise decrease efficiency.").
40. See id. ("[H]and delivering the document may be impossible given geographical
limitations.").
41.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4.html.
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.

org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4.html.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4_comm.html.
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or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently,
then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly noty the sender in order
to permit that person to take protective measures.'
Additionally, the comment explains that it is "a matter of law beyond
the scope of these Rules" as to "[w]hether the [receiving] lawyer is
required to take additional steps, such as returning the original
document" as well as "whether the privileged status of a document has
been waived."4 5 Paragraph three of the comment to Rule 4.4 sets out
that "[s]ome lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for
example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it
was inadvertently sent to the wrong address."46 However, "[w]here a
lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to
voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment
ordinarily reserved to the lawyer." 47 Thus, because the definition of
"document" provided in paragraph two of the comment to Rule 4.4
arguably includes the metadata of an electronic document, the rule
appears to require a receiving attorney to inform the sending attorney
upon discovery of sensitive information in the metadata of an electronic
document when the receiving attorney should realize opposing counsel
included the information inadvertently. However, neither Rule 4.4(b)
nor its comment states that the receiving attorney has any other duties
with regard to such information.
B. Model Rule 1.3 Diligence and Model Rule 1.1 Competence
At least one ethics panel has asserted that the duties of diligence, as
set out in Model Rule 1.3, and competence, as set out in Model Rule
1.1, require a receiving attorney to view metadata in an electronic
document forwarded by opposing counsel.4 8 Model Rule 1.3 states, "A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client." 49 Model Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to "provide
competent representation to a client" and states that "[c]ompetent

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. cmt. 3.
47. Id.
48. See Vt. B. Ass'n Prof 1 Responsibility Sec., Op. 2009-1 (2009), available at
http://www.vtbar.org/Upload%20Files/WebPages/Attomey/o2OResources/aeopinions/Advisory
%20Ethics%200pinions/Electronic%20Documents/09-01.pdf ("[T]here is a clear basis for an
inference that thorough review of documents received from opposing counsel, including a
search for and review of metadata included in electronically transmitted documents, is required
by VRPC 1.1 Competence, and VRPC 1.3 Diligence.").
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010), availableat http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/mrpc/rule_1_3.html.
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representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."so The
comment to Model Rule 1.1 goes on to explain that "[c]ompetent
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also
includes adequate preparation." 5 '
C. Model Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
Ethics panels that have concluded attorneys should not view the
metadata contained in electronic documents forwarded by opposing
counsel have asserted that this conduct implicates the duty of
However, a close
confidentiality set out in Model Rule 1.6.
examination of the rule reveals that it only requires attorneys to not
disclose their own client's sensitive information and does not
necessarily preclude opposing attornes from accessing the sensitive
information of other attorneys' clients. Nevertheless, the comment to
the rule does expressly indicate that an attorney has a duty to handle his
or her own client's sensitive information in a competent manner and to
guard against inadvertent disclosures of such information. 54
Model Rule 1.6 sets out an attorney's duty of confidentiality in
subsection (a) by stating that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation" or one of the exceptions enumerated in subsection (b)
apply.5 5 Paragraph one of the comment to Rule 1.6 indicates the duty of
confidentiality deals with an attorney's duty not to disclose his or her
own client's information by stating, "This Rule governs the disclosure
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010), availableat http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/rule_li .html.
51. Id. cmt. 5.
52. See Ala. St. B. Off. Gen. Couns., Op. 2007-02 (2007), availableat http://www.alabar.
org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneld=412; Fla. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 06-02
(2006), availableat http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBETOpin.nsf/b2b76d49e9fd64a585257005
0067a7aflOalb5e3a86df495a8525714eOO5dd6fd!OpenDocument; Me. Prof. Ethics Commission
Board Overseers Bar, Op. 196 (2008), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/
index. php?topic=mebar overseersethics opinions&id=63337&v-article; N.H. B. Ass'n Ethics
Committee, Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009), available at http://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/Ethics
Opinion2008-9-4.pdf; N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available
at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/Co
ntentDisplay.cfi&CONTENTID=6533.
53. See infra notes 55-56, 243-44 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010), availableat http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/rule_I_6.html.
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by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client
during the lawyer's representation of the client.' 5 6
Moreover, paragraph sixteen of the comment to Rule 1.6 describes
an attorney's duty to protect against inadvertent disclosure of sensitive
client information. "A lawyer must act competently to safeguard
information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are
participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the
lawyer's supervision."" Furthermore, paragraph seventeen of the
comments to Rule 1.6 addresses a lawyer's duties when transmitting
sensitive client information explaining:
When transmitting a communication that includes information
relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take
reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming
into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does
not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the
method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special
precautions.5 8
Therefore, while setting out affirmative duties for sending attorneys to
guard against the disclosure of confidential client information through
its inclusion in the metadata of electronic documents forwarded to an
opposing attorney, neither the language of Rule 1.6 nor its comment set
out any duty for attorneys regarding the handling of opposing parties'
information, much less such information contained in metadata.
D. Model Rule 8.4 Misconduct
At least two ethics panels that have concluded attorneys should not
view metadata contained in electronic documents transmitted by
opposing counsel have cited the broad prohibitions contained in Model
Rule 8.4(c) and (d) as prohibiting such conduct. 59 Model Rule 8.4 states
that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage in

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or]
56. Id. cmt. 1.
57. Id. cmt. 16.
58. Id. cmt. 17.
59. See Me. Prof. Ethics Commission Board Overseers Bar, Op. 196 (2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar-overseers-ethicsopinions&id=
63337&v-article; N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfn&CONTENTID=6533.
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(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice"o
The ethics opinions that conclude that attorneys should not view
metadata in electronic documents often assert that such conduct is
"prejudicial to the administration of justice." So, it is appropriate to
examine in greater detail how various authorities generally have
interpreted their jurisdiction's versions of Model Rule 8.4(d) because
the "prejudicial to the administration of justice" language is particularly
vague and amorphous. The Oregon Supreme Court has stated that an
attorney engages in "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice" by "engaging in conduct that causes, or has the potential to
cause, harm either to the procedural functioning of a judicial proceeding
or to the substantive interest of a party to that proceeding." 6 1 This same
court noted that "'conduct' encompasses both doing something that one
should not do and not doing something that one is required to do." 62
Moreover, prejudice requires "either repeated conduct causing some
harm or a single act causing substantial harm to the administration of
justice. ,,63
Another authority has also noted that the prohibited conduct must
have occurred "in the context of the 'administration of justice."' 64 "The
administration of justice consists in the trial of cases in the court, and
their judicial determination and disposition by orderly procedure, under
rules of law, and putting of the judgment into effect." 65 Therefore,
"most situations in which an attorney's conduct has been held to be
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/mrpc/rule_8_4.html.
61. In re Conduct of Claussen, 909 P.2d 862, 870 (Or. 1996). See also Or. St. B. Ass'n
Board Governors, Formal Op. 1998-150, 1998 WL 199531 (1998) (applying the Claussen
definition of "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" to include the inadvertent
disclosure of a privileged document during pre-trial discovery).
62. Claussen, 909 P.2d at 871.
63. Id. See also In re Hopkins, 677 A.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he attorney's
conduct must taint the judicial process in more than a de minimis way; that is, at least potentially
impact upon the process to a serious and adverse degree."); Or. St. B. Ass'n Board Governors,
Formal Op. 2005-139, 2005 WL 5679563 (2005) (noting that "[tihe amount of harm so caused
must be more than minimal").
64. Or. St. B. Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op. 2005-139, 2005 WL 5679563 (2005);
See also Polk v. State Bar of Tex., 374 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (concluding that the
bar had made "no showing" that the attorney's conduct at issue "was probative of any inability
to represent clients or that this statement would interfere with the processes of the administration
of justice"); Or. St. B. Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op. 1998-150, 1998 WL 199531 (1998)
(noting that an attorney who inadvertently receives from opposing counsel a document protected
by the attorney-client privilege outside of litigation does not necessarily engage in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice "due to the non-litigation context" by not returning
the document).
65. Howell v. State of Tex., 559 S.W.2d 432, 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (quoting Massey
v. City of Macon, 104 S.E.2d 518, 521-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958) (alteration in original)).
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prejudicial to the administration of justice have involved judicial or
adjudicative proceedings." 66 However, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has construed the term "administration of justice" in a broader manner
"to encompass 'conduct the lawyer engages in outside his or her role as
a lawyer."' 67 This same court has stated that "conduct that impacts on
the image or the perception of the courts or the legal profession . .. and

that engenders disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession may
be prejudicial to the administration of justice." 6 8 Jurisdictions often
apply ethical provisions with the "conduct prejudicial to administration
of justice" language from Model Rule 8.4(d) in conjunction with other
provisions that proscribe more specific attorney conduct. 69
Perhaps most important, when using a rule prohibiting "conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice" as the sole basis for attorney
66. In re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (Mass. 1996); see also In
re Hopkins, 677 A.2d at 61 ("[TIhe conduct itself must bear directly upon the judicial process []
with respect to an identifiable case or tribunal. This of course will very likely be the case where
the attorney is acting either as an attorney or in a capacity ordinarily associated with the practice
of law."). La. State Bar Ass'n v. Harrington, 585 So. 2d 514, 520 n.4 (La. 1991) ("The
proscription against conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, while phrased
somewhat broadly, involves, in most but not all cases, misconduct during litigation"). The
Washington Supreme Court has even stated "that conduct deemed prejudicial to the
administration of justice has generally been conduct of an attorney in his official or advocatory
role or conduct which might physically interfere with enforcing the law." In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 970 (Wash. 1990). However, another court has
characterized the position taken in Curranas a "minority position on this issue." In re Discipline
of Stuhff, 837 P.2d 853, 855 n.3 (Nev. 1992).
67. Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Link, 844 A.2d 1197, 1210 (Md. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Childress, 758 A.2d 117, 122 (Md. Ct. App. 2000)); see
also, e.g., N.C. REv. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (2010), available at

http://www.ncbar.com/rules/rules.asp. ("The phrase 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice' in paragraph (d) should be read broadly to proscribe a wide variety of conduct, including
conduct that occurs outside the scope of judicial proceedings."); Att'y Grievance Comm'n of
Md. v. Casalino, 644 A.2d 43, 46 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the attorney engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by being found guilty of willful tax evasion);
but see also In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that an attorney's willful
evasion of payment of taxes did not constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice because his "misconduct did not bear directly upon any decision or the decision-making
process of any tribunal").
68. Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Richardson, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (Md. Ct. App.
1998) (citations omitted).
69. See In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (N.J. 1982) ("The New Jersey cases disclose a
pattern of applying DR 1-102 (A)(5)[which prohibited attorneys from engaging in 'conduct ...
prejudicial to the administration of justice'] in conjunction with other more specific disciplinary
rules to sanction attorney misconduct."); see also 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW

OF LAWYERING § 65.6, at 15 (3d ed. 2009) (noting the redundancy of the rule because "Rule
8.4(d) overlaps with a large number of the rules in Part 3 of the Rules of Professional Conductalmost all of the limits upon advocacy specified in those rules are designed to protect the
integrity of the judicial system").
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discipline, some jurisdictions have noted that the rule only should be
applied to especially egregious behavior. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has stated that "on those few occasions when the rule has served
as the sole basis for discipline, it has been applied only in situations
involving conduct flagrantly violative of accepted professional
norms." "[C]onduct that does not violate any other disciplinary rule
cannot violate [the rule] unless it is so 'egregious' and 'flagrantly
violative of accepted professional norms' as to 'undermine the
legitimacy of the judicial process."' 71 The Florida Supreme Court has
stated that the language "is not so broad as to include all conduct which
is illegal but rather those activities, for example, more directly
associated with 'bribery of jurors, subornation of perjury,
misrepresentations to a court or any other conduct which undermines
the legitimacy of the judicial processes."' 72
Courts have limited this language in this manner because "[w]ithout
such limiting interpretations," such a rule presents "the risk of
vagueness and arbitrary application." 73 Making a broader range of
attorney conduct susceptible to this amorphous language would risk
being unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because attorneys
would be unaware of the exact type of conduct prohibited by the rule
and disciplinary boards could enforce such provisions in an arbitrary
manner. Moreover, one set of commentators has noted that "[t]he
70. Hinds, 449 A.2d at 498.
71. In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Mass. 2004) (quoting In re
Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d at 1093); cf In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against
Curran, 801 P.2d at 970 ("[W]e hold that this rule [which prohibits attorneys from showing
disrespect for the law or acts involving moral turpitude] only extends to violations of practice
norms and physical interference with the administration ofjustice.").
72. Fla. Bar v. Pettie, 424 So. 2d 734, 737-38 (Fla. 1983) (quoting Polk v. State Bar of
Tex., 374 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Tex. 1974)); but see Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v.
Casalino, 644 A.2d 43, 46 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) ("While certain conduct, such as suborning
witnesses, destroying evidence or making false representations to the court, would have a more
direct impact on the administration of justice, acts of dishonesty by lawyers also impede the
judicial system.").
73. In re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (Mass. 1996).
74. In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d at 1079-80 ("We are cognizant of the
view that broad, codified language such as that contained in DR 1-102(A)(5) can never satisfy
due process concerns.... Having adopted a cabining construction of DR 1-102(A)(5) to protect
the due process rights of attorneys charged with conduct 'prejudicial to the administration of
justice,' we decline to jettison the rule altogether."); In re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660
N.E.2d at 1099 (stating that "[w]ithout such limiting interpretations of DR 1-102(A)(5), the rule
presents the risk of vagueness and arbitrary application"); Hinds, 449 A.2d at 498 ("Thus, the
rule's broad language proscribing acts 'prejudicial to the administration of justice' takes on
sufficient definition to pass constitutional muster, given these prior judicial determinations
narrowing its scope to particularly egregious conduct."); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1991) ("Rather than an absolute prohibition on broad standards, the guiding
principle must be whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its ethical strictures,
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debate leading to adoption of Rule 8.4(d) by the ABA House of
Delegates made clear that it was intended to address violations of wellunderstood norms and conventions of practice only."75

IV. STANCES

OF ETHICS COMMITTEES

The issue of attorneys viewing metadata has proved to be
sufficiently perplexing that ethics committees throughout the United
States have taken a variety of positions on whether or not it is ethically
permissible. First, the American Bar Association (ABA) has issued an
opinion concluding that an attorney ethically may review the metadata
contained in an electronic document received from opposing counsel.76
A significant number of state ethics committees have come to the same
conclusion. 7 Second, a large number of state ethics committees have
concluded that attorneys should not access the metadata of electronic
documents transmitted to them by opposing counsel. The ethics
committees in these jurisdictions largely follow the analysis provided by
a New York State Bar Association ethics opinion from 2001 . Third, an
equally large number of jurisdictions have decided to follow an

would have notice of what conduct is proscribed.").
[T]he breadth of such provisions [stating general grounds for discipline such as
contained in Rule 8.4(d)] creates the risk that a charge using only such
language would fail to give fair warning of the nature of the charges to a lawyer
respondent . . . and that subjective and idiosyncratic considerations could
influence a hearing panel or reviewing court in resolving a charge based only
on it.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§5

cmt. c (2000).

The larger problem with Rule 8.4(d) is that it may signify the existence of
other, as yet undefined, offenses against a tribunal or against the administration
of justice.. .. [A]n open-ended rule is dangerous. In other words, subsection
(d) raises the specter of a disciplinary authority creating new offenses by
common law, and perhaps harassing an unpopular lawyer through selective
enforcement of the new standard.
2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§

65.6, at 15.

75. Id. at 16.
76. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006)); see
infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing the ABA opinion in detail).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 95-121 (discussing state ethics opinions
concluding that ethics rules do not prohibit attorneys from viewing metadata).
78. See infra notes 122-74 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
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approach somewhere in between these "all or nothing" stances.s For
example, one concluded that attorneys should decide how to deal with
inadvertent disclosure of metadata on a case-by-case basis, 8 1 and
another decided that an attorney is prohibited ethically from viewing
metadata of an electronic document only when he or she has "actual
prior knowledge that the metadata was inadvertently provided." 82 So,
currently the answer to whether or not an attorney ethically may view
metadata in an electronic document forwarded by opposing counsel
depends on the jurisdiction where the attorney is located and whether or
not that jurisdiction explicitly has addressed the issue.
A. Ethics Opinions Concluding that Receiving Attorneys Can Look at
MetadataContainedin Documents Transmittedby Opposing Counsel
The ABA was one of the first bar organizations to issue an ethics
opinion concluding that attorneys ethically may view the metadata
contained in electronic documents received from opposing counsel.83 Its
ethics opinion started by noting that "[t]he Model Rules of Professional
Conduct do not contain any specific prohibition against a lawyer's
reviewing and using embedded information in electronic documents." 84
The opinion recognized that "[n]ot all metadata . . . is of any

consequence" and that "most is probably of no import."85 However, the
committee did acknowledge that under certain circumstances "the date
and time that a critical document was created or who drafted it may be a
critical piece of information." 86 Furthermore, in a situation in which "a
payment amount is being negotiated, then a redlined change or a
comment in a draft agreement that suggests how much more the
opposing party is willing to pa or how much less they might take likely
is of the highest importance."
However, the committee noted that the "most closely applicable
[ethics] rule," Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b), dealing with
"a lawyer's receipt of inadvertently sent information. ... is silent as to
the ethical propriety of a lawyer's review or use of such information."
80. See infra notes 175-211 and accompanying text.
81. Pa. B. Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 2007-500, 2007
WL 5314341 (2007); see also infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (discussing opinion).
82. D.C. B. Ethics Committee, Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for
lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm; see infra notes 186-96 and accompanying
text (discussing opinion).
83. ABA Committee on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The opinion recognized that under Rule 4.4(b) "the sole requirement" of
a receiving attorney was to provide "notice to the sender of the receipt
of inadvertently sent information."89 Moreover, the committee
concluded "the recent addition of Rule 4.4(b)" with this sole
requirement was "evidence of the intention to set no other specific
restrictions on the receiving lawyer's conduct." 90 However, the
committee indicated that whether or not a receiving lawyer should know
that the inclusion of metadata in an electronic document transmitted by
opposing counsel "was 'inadvertent' within the meaning of Rule 4.4(b)
... [was] outside the scope of this opinion." 9 1
The ABA opinion in a footnote also expressly rejected the view that
accessing metadata in an electronic document received from opposing
counsel constituted "conduct 'involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation' or [conduct] 'that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice"' as prohibited by Model Rule 8.4(c) and (d). 9 2 "[T]he
Committee does not believe that a lawyer, by acting within the
circumstances assumed by the instant opinion, would violate either of
those paragraphs of Rule 8.4."93 Additionally, after describing some
ways in which a person can eliminate or reduce metadata in an
electronic document, the committee suggested that an attorney
"concerned about risks relating to metadata" can "seek to negotiate a
confidentiality agreement" with his or her opponent. 94 However, the
committee acknowledged that "if the embedded information is on a
subject such as her client's willingness to settle at a particular price,
then there might be no way to 'pull back' that information."95
The Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Committee, likewise, has
determined that an attorney "who receives electronic documents or files
generally may search for and review metadata." 96 In explaining its
rationale, the committee started by stating that "there is nothing
inherently deceitful or surreptitious about searching for metadata."
The committee noted that:
Some metadata can be revealed by simply passing a computer
cursor over a document on the screen or right-clicking on a
computer mouse to open a drop-down menu that includes the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. n.10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Colo. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Formal Op. 119 (2008), available at http://www.
cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/sublD/23789/CETH//.
97. Id.
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option to review certain metadata. Typical word processing
software can be configured so that files are routinely opened to
show redlines or embedded comments. 98
Thus, other ethics committees characterizations of viewing metadata as
'mining' or 'surreptitiously 'get[ting] behind" a document is,
therefore, misleading." 99
The committee then went on to express "that, in many
circumstances, metadata do not contain [c]onfidential [i]nformation"
and that "in some circumstances metadata are intended to be searched
for, reviewed, and used." 00 As one example, the committee proposed
that "a [s]ending [1]awyer may specifically intend a [r]eceiving [1]awyer
to review some metadata, such as redlines or comments in a draft of the
document."' 0 Furthermore, the committee observed that "metadata are
often of no import. In many circumstances it is of no significance who
like." 102
created a document, when the document was created, or the
The committee went on to conclude:
Once one discards the notions that it is dishonest or deceitful to
search for or look at metadata or that metadata typically contain
significant [c]onfidential [i]nformation, there is no Rule in the
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct that contains any
prohibition on a lawyer generally reviewing or usinf information
received from opposing counsel or other third party.
Therefore, the committee concluded that an attorney ethically "may
search for and review any metadata included in an electronic document
or file."104
Additionally, the committee decided that if the receiving attorney
"knows or reasonably should know that an electronic document or file
contains metadata that appear to contain [c]onfidential [i]nformation,
the [r]eceiving [1]awyer should assume that the [c]onfidential
[i]nformation was transmitted inadvertently, and must promptly notify
the [s]ending [lawyer." 05 Either the receiving or sending attorney then
can decide to seek a determination from a court "as to the proper
disposition of the electronic document or file, based on the substantive
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
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law of waiver." 06
The committee stated that only when the receiving attorney had
notice from the sending attorney prior to viewing metadata that the
metadata in the electronic document inadvertently contained
confidential information did the receiving attorney have to refrain from
examining the metadata and "abide by the sender's instructions
regarding the disposition of the metadata." 0 7 The committee based this
conclusion on additional language contained in subsection (c) of
Colorado's version of Rule 4.4 that is not included in Model Rule 4.4.
This language expressly requires an attorney to "not examine the
document and . . . abide by the sender's instructions as to its

disposition" when an attorney "receives a document relating to the
representation of the lawyer's client" and "receives notice from the
sender that the document was inadvertently sent."108
Nevertheless, the committee determined that the receiving attorney
did not have to refrain from examining the metadata of an electronic
document when the receiving attorney discovered confidential
information on his or her own and the sending attorney did not give
prior notice. 109 The committee reasoned that "[Colorado] Rule 4.4(b)
and (c) are the more specific rules" and, therefore, "trump the more
general requirements of Rule 8.4(c)" which deals with dishonest
attorney conduct."10 Thus, because under Rule 4.4(b) "upon viewing
confidential metadata" the receiving attorney's sole duty "is to notify
the [s]ending [1]awyer," the committee concluded that "[t]here is no rule
that prohibits the [r]eceiving [1]awyer from continuing to review the
electronic document or file and its associated metadata.""' Therefore,
the Colorado opinion found it ethical for attorneys not only to view the
metadata from electronic documents forwarded by an opponent but to
continue to view that information even after discovering that it contains
confidential client information.112
The Professional Responsibility Section of the Vermont Bar
Association also recently concluded that attorneys ethically may view
metadata in electronic documents transmitted by opposing counsel."13
The Vermont ethics committee found "nothing [in the Vermont Rules of
106. Id.
107.

Id.

108. Id. (quoting Colo. Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 4.4(c) (2010), available at
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/20495/subID/22461/CETH/).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Vt. B. Ass'n Prof Resp. Sec., Op. 2009-1 (2009), available at http://www.vtbar.org/
Upload%20Files/WebPages/AttorneyO/o20Resources/aeopinions/AdvisoryO/o2OEthics%200pinio
ns/Electronic%20Documents/09-01.pdf.
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Professional Conduct] to compel the conclusion that a lawyer who
receives an electronic file from opposing counsel would be ethically
prohibited from reviewing that file using any available tools to expose
In fact, the committee
the file's content, including metadata.""
asserted that "[a] rule prohibiting a search for metadata . .. would, in

essence, represent a limit on the ability of a lawyer diligently and
thoroughly to analyze material received from opposing counsel."' 1 The
committee determined that "there is a clear basis for an inference" that
the ethics rules dealing with attorney competence and diligence require
a "thorough review of documents received from opposing counsel,
including a search for and review of metadata."ll 6
The committee further concluded that Vermont's version of Model
Rule 3.4, entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel," "where
such an obligation [not to view metadata] would most likely be found
... is wholly silent on this issue."' Moreover, the court noted that the

Vermont rules dealing with "Respect for Rights of Third Persons" and
"Misconduct" do not "directly address this issue,"118 although other
ethics panels have cited their jurisdiction's version of these rules as
support for a prohibition on such conduct. However, the Vermont
committee acknowledged Vermont's recent adoption of Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) and, therefore, concluded that "Vermont
lawyers are subject to the obligation to notify opposing counsel if they
receive documents that they know or reasonably should know were
inadvertently disclosed."ll 9 The opinion discussed this in the context of
addressing "whether inadvertently disclosed confidential information,
including metadata, can be used by the lawyer who receives it."1 20 So,
although not expressly stated in the opinion, the obligation to inform
opposing counsel presumably extends to inadvertently transmitted
confidential communications revealed in the metadata of an electronic
document.
Finally, Maryland is also among the jurisdictions with an ethics
committee that has concluded an attorney ethically can view the
metadata of an electronic document transmitted by an opposing
attorney.121 The Maryland State Bar Association's Committee on Ethics
stated in its opinion that it "believe[d] that there is no ethical violation if
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Md. St. B. Ass'n, Committee on Ethics Docket, Op. 2007-09, 40-APR Md. B. J. 52
(Apr. 2007).
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the recipient attorney . . . reviews or makes use of the metadata without
first ascertaining whether the sender intended to include such
metadata."l 22 However, the Maryland ethics committee's opinion was
"heavily influenced by the difference between the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct and the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct." 23 Specifically, the committee noted that
Maryland had not adopted Model Rule 4.4(b), which requires an
attorney to "promptly notify the sender" when the attorney receives a
document relating to the representation of a client that appears to have
been inadvertently sent.'
"Accordingly, the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct do not require the receiving attorney to notify the
sending attorney that there may have been an inadvertent transmittal of
privileged (or, for that matter, work product) materials." 25 Thus, the
ethics committees in at least three jurisdictions, in addition to the ABA
committee, have concluded that an attorney ethically may view
metadata contained in an electronic document or file forwarded by
opposing counsel.
B. Ethics Opinions Concluding that Receiving Attorneys Should Not
Look at Metadata Containedin Documents Transmittedby
Opposing Counsel
The New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional
Ethics authored the leading ethics opinion concluding that a receiving
attorney should not examine the metadata from an electronic document
transmitted by opposing counsel.12 6 However, in its 2001 opinion, the
committee appeared to overestimate the difficulty of viewing the
metadata contained in an electronic document. The New York ethics
committee emphasized that "[m]odern computer technology" allows
"sophisticated users" to obtain information in e-mail and electronic
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.

abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4.html.
125. Md. St. B. Ass'n, Committee on Ethics Docket, Op. 2007-09, 40 Md. B. J. 52 (Apr.
2007). The committee did acknowledge that the new version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16, dealing with pretrial conferences, encouraged parties to lawsuits to "try to reach agreements
concerning the assertion of claims of privilege or protection as to trial-preparation materials
even after production of such documents" and that an attorney could engage "in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice" if he or she did not abide by agreements made with
his or her opponent in the litigation concerning such matters that would supersede the ethical
standard set out by the committee. Id.
126. N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cftn&CONTENTID=6533.
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documents received from opposing counsel "that the sender has not
intentionally made available to the lawyer." 2 7 As an example, the
committee posed that "a lawyer who has received the final draft of a
contract from counsel for a party with whom the lawyer is negotiating
would be able to see prior drafts of the contract and, perhaps, learn the
identity of those who made the revisions, without the knowledge or
consent of the sending lawyer." 28
The opinion also addressed activity that is much more egregious and
clandestine than simply looking at the metadata of an electronic
document. The opinion noted that it is "possible for an e-mail sender to
determine the subsequent route of the e-mail, including comments on
the e-mail written by its ultimate recipients."' 2 9 In placing such a "bug"
in an e-mail, the sender can "learn the identity of those with whom the
first recipient shares the message and comments that these persons may
make about it."130 The committee then described the issue that the
opinion would address as whether "a lawyer ethically may use available
technology to surreptitiously examine and trace e-mail and other
electronic documents."l 3 '
Although no New York ethics provision expressly addressed such
activity, the committee concluded "that the use of computer technology
in the manner described above constitutes an impermissible intrusion on
the attorney-client relationship in violation of the [New York] Code [of
Professional Responsibility]." 32 The committee emphasized that "[t]he
protection of the confidences and secrets of a client are among the most
significant obligations imposed on a lawyer." 33 The committee went on
to state that "we believe the circumstances described are substantively
analogous to less technologically sophisticated means of invading the
attorney-client relationship that we and other authorities have addressed
and rejected as inconsistent with the ethical norms of the profession."1 34
The committee compared the conduct noted in the opinion to "soliciting
the disclosure of unauthorized communications" and "exploiting the
willingness of others to undermine the confidentiality principle."l3
The opinion also noted that ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 counseled
against "making use of inadvertent disclosures of confidential
communications." 36 However, the ABA later withdrew the stance set
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
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out in that opinion in light of the ABA's adoption of Model Rule
4.4(b).' 3 7 The New York opinion went on to state that "in light of the
strong public policy in favor of preserving confidentiality as the
foundation of the lawyer-client relationship, use of technology to
surreptitiously obtain [privileged or confidential] information . .. would

violate the letter and spirit of' the New York ethics rules prohibiting
attorneys "from engaging in conduct 'involving dishonesty, fraud,
.
deceit or misrepresentation'
1 38

. .

and 'conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice."'
Then, instead of analyzing situations dealing with simple inadvertent
disclosure of documents by sending attorneys, the opinion supported its
position by referring to a prior New York ethics opinion that "concluded
that a lawyer who receives an unsolicited and unauthorized
communication from a former employee of an adversary's law firm may
not seek information from that person if the communication would
exploit the adversary's confidences or secrets."' 39 The committee noted
that in this prior ethics opinion it relied on ABA Formal Opinion 92-368
which, as stated above, the ABA has since withdrawn, "in support of
our conclusion that the strong public policy in favor of confidentiality
outweighed what might be seen as the competing principles of zealous
representation [] and encouraging more careful conduct." 40
The committee stated that "[t]he circumstances of the present inquiry
present an even more compelling case against surreptitious
acquisition."' 4 1 The opinion, in effect, exonerated attorneys who
forward documents to the opposing attorney from any fault for failing to
remove confidential or privileged information from the metadata of
documents. The committee stated, "First, to the extent that the other
lawyer has 'disclosed,' it is an unknowing and unwilling, rather than
inadvertent or careless, disclosure."l 4 2 The committee asserted that no
balance between "encouraging more careful conduct" and "the public
policy in favor of confidentiality" needed to "be struck here because it
is a deliberate act by the receiving lawyer, not carelessness on the part
of the sending lawyer . . . that would lead to the disclosure of client

(1992).
137. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005)
("[B]ecause the conclusion of Formal Opinion 92-368 presently conflicts with amended Rule
4.4, the opinion is hereby withdrawn.").
138. N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfn&CONTENTID-6533.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citation omitted).
14 1. Id.
142. Id.
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confidences and secrets." 43 Furthermore, the committee stated that it
did not need to "balance the protection of confidentiality against the
principles of zealous representation" because New York ethics rules
"carefully circumscribe[] factual and legal representations a lawyer can
make, people a lawgr may contact, and actions a lawyer can take on
Therefore, "[p]rohibiting the intentional use of
behalf of a client."
computer technology to surreptitiously obtain privileged or otherwise
consistent with these ethical
confidential information is entire
restraints on uncontrolled advocacy. 45
Ethics opinions from Alabama and Florida have adopted the stance
of the New York State Bar Association's ethics panel with little
analysis.146 Similarly, the Ethics Committee of the New Hampshire Bar
Association recently concluded that "[i]t is impermissible for receiving
lawyers to search for, review or use confidential information in the form
of metadata that is associated with transmission of electronic materials
from opposing counsel."14 7 In analyzing the ethical duties of an attorney
that receives an electronic document from opposing counsel, the
committee started by reviewing "the variety of circumstances under
143. Id. Perhaps paradoxically, the New York Bar Association's ethics committee
concluded in a subsequent opinion that an attorney who sends a document by e-mail as an
attachment has a duty to use reasonable care to make sure that he or she does not inadvertently
include confidential client information in the metadata of the attached electronic file. N.Y. St. B.
Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 782 (2004), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfn&CONTENT
ID=13630 ("Lawyers have a duty under DR 4-101 to use reasonable care when transmitting
documents by e-mail to prevent the disclosure of metadata containing client confidences or
secrets.").
144. N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfn?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfn&CONTENTID=6533.
145. Id.
146. Ala. St. B. Off. Gen. Couns., Op. 2007-02 (2007), availableat http://www.alabar.org/
ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneld=412 (concluding that "[t]he mining of metadata constitutes a
knowing and deliberate attempt by the recipient attorney to acquire confidential and privileged
information in order to obtain an unfair advantage against an opposing party", and agreeing with
the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics in formal opinion 749.
); Fla. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 06-02 (2006), available at http://www.
floridabar.org/tfb/TFBETOpin.nsf/b2b76d49e9fd64a5852570050067a7af/0alb5e3a86df495a85
25714e005dd6fd!OpenDocument ("It is the recipient lawyer's concomitant obligation, upon
receiving an electronic communication or document from another lawyer, not to try to obtain
from metadata information relating to the representation of the sender's client that the recipient
knows or should know is not intended for the recipient. Any such metadata is to be considered
by the receiving lawyer as confidential information which the sending lawyer did not intend to
transmit.") (discussing New York State Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics
formal opinion 749 in a supporting footnote).
147. N.H. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009), available at http://www.
nhbar.org/uploads/pdfEthicsOpinion2008-9-4.pdf
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which metadata might be received and reviewed." 48 The opinion first
noted "in the context of negotiating a contract, a sending lawyer might
intend the receiving lawyer to search and review relined comments in a
draft document or to review underlying formulas used to create a
spreadsheet." 4 9 Contrastingly, "a sending lawyer may send a draft
contract that includes a client's comment on 'bottom line price' that the
lawyer either was unaware existed in metadata contained within a
document or that the lawyer had unsuccessfully attempted to
eliminate."o50 The committee stated that the sending attorney "may have
exercised reasonable care in avoiding disclosure of client confidences
through transmission of metadata" and "that [the] receiving lawyer may
use sophisticated software to reveal or recover information not revealed
by most programs.",s5
The committee then noted the language of New Hampshire's version
of Model Rule 4.4(b), which unlike the Model Rule, contains an
additional duty for an attorney "not [to] examine . . . materials" the
attorney "knows . . . [were] inadvertently sent."' 5 2 Model Rule 4.4(b)
only requires an attorney to "promptly notify the sender" upon receiving
a document that the attorney "knows or reasonably should know" the
opposing attorney sent inadvertently.' 53 In fact, comment two to Model
Rule 4.4 expressly states that "[w]hether the lawyer is required to take
additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of
law beyond the scope of these Rules."' 54 Furthermore, comment three to
Model Rule 4.4 states that "[w]here a lawyer is not required by
applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such
document [without reading it] is a matter of professional judgment
ordinarily reserved to the lawyer."'1
The New Hampshire opinion did not necessarily note the additional
duty to refrain from viewing imposed by New Hampshire's version of
Model Rule 4.4(b).156 However, the committee did recognize some
differences in language between the New Hampshire and the ABA
versions of the rule and stated that "[t]hese differences are significant in
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.; N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.courts.
state.nh.us/rules/pcon/pcon-4_4.htm.
153. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/rule 44.html.
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4_comm.html.
155. Id. cmt. 3.
156. N.H. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009), available at http://www.
nhbar.org/uploads/pdflEthicsOpinion2008-9-4.pdf
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light of the ABA's conclusion, shared by a number of jurisdictions, that
there is no express ethical prohibition against a receiving lawyer
reviewing or using opposing counsel's metadata."157
The committee went on to acknowledge that "there is a split on
whether it is permissible for attorneys to review or use metadata
received from their opponents."' 58 After reviewing some of the ethics
opinions concluding that ethics rules do not prohibit an attorney from
viewing metadata in an electronic file forwarded by opposing counsel,
the committee stated that it believed "that all circumstances, with the
exception of express waiver and mutual agreement on review of
metadata, lead to a necessary conclusion that metadata is 'inadvertently
sent' as that term is used in Rule 4.4(b)."1 59 Moreover, "because no
lawyer would intentionally send confidential information in violation of
Rule 1.6, the receiving lawyer necessarily 'knows' that the information
has been inadvertently sent."160 "The objective standard dictates a
conclusion that receipt of confidential information in the form of
metadata is the result of inadvertence . . . ."161 Therefore, "[New
Hampshire Ethics] Rule 4.4(b) imposes an obligation on the receiving
lawyer to refrain from reviewing the metadata."'
Similar to the New York ethics opinion, the New Hampshire ethics
committee emphasized that "purposefully seeking to unearth
confidential information embedded in metadata attached to a document
provided by opposing counsel implicates the broad principles
underlying the Rules, including the strong public policy in favor of
maintaining client confidentiality." 63 Citing the New Hampshire
version of Rule 4.4(b), the committee took the view that "there is a
shared responsibility on both sides to protect the attorney-client
privilege."
In fact, the opinion went so far as to compare viewing "an
opponent's metadata" to "peeking at opposing counsel's notes during a
deposition or purposely eavesdropping on a conversation between
counsel and client." 65 According to the opinion, an attorney should be
able to assume that their opponent will not seek out confidential
information "regardless of the ease in uncovering the information." 66
"Therefore, unless receiving lawyers have a sound basis to believe that
the information was intentionally sent or there has been an express
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
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waiver of confidentiality, receiving lawyers should not take steps to
review or to use metadata embedded in documents received from
opposing counsel."' 6 7 Moreover, "[tlo the extent that metadata is
unintentionally reviewed, receiving lawyers should abide by the
directives set forth in Rule 4.4(b " to promptly notify the sender and
refrain from viewing the material. 68
The Maine Professional Ethics Commission of the Board of
Overseers of the Bar also concluded that attorneys should not attempt to
view metadata in an electronic file transmitted by opposing counsel.169
This opinion began by noting that "[m]uch metadata is mundane and
legally inconsequential, lodged within the document by the software
and identifying the date and time that the document was produced and
the version of the software utilized" and that "[s]ome of this data may
be accessed with as little effort as resting the cursor upon, or right
clicking, the document icon."' 7 0 Nevertheless, "purposeful efforts to
'mine' metadata in a document may allow a receiving attorney to glean
information that . . . . could result in the disclosure of client

confidences, litigation and negotiation strategy, legal theories, attorney
work product and other legally privileged and confidential
Moreover, "[d]ue to the rapid advance and general
information."
opaqueness of some computer technology," an attorney reasonably may
not know "the extent to which such data may be subject to being probed
using extraordinary but technologically available
by someone
72

methods."

After reviewing the analysis of ethics panels in other jurisdictions,
the Maine commission stated that it "believe[d] that the better view is
that generally expressed by New York and the jurisdictions that have
followed it."'7 The opinion recognized that "no Maine] Bar Rule
specifically addresses this particular situation." 4 However, the
members of the commission still thought it appropriate to apply the
Maine version of Model Rule 8.4(c),(d), which prohibits attorneys from
"engaging in conduct involving dishonesty or prejudicial to the
administration of justice, [to] an attorney who purposefully seeks to
unearth confidential information embedded in metadata attached to a
document provided by counsel for another party, when the attorney
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Me. Prof. Ethics Commission Board Overseers Bar, Op. 196 (2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic-mebar-overseers-ethics opinions&id=
63337&v-article.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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knows or should know that the information involved was not intended
to be disclosed."' 7 5 "Not only is the attorney's conduct dishonest in
purposefully seeking by this method to uncover confidential
information of another party, that conduct strikes at the foundational
principles that protect attorney-client confidences, and in doing so it
clearly prejudices the administration of justice."07 6
The commission supported its conclusions by acknowledging that in
an earlier opinion, it had adopted the position of the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court that an attorney cannot "retain and make use of
confidential information that had been inadvertently disclosed to him by
opposing counsel .. . based upon the shared responsibility to protect the
attorney-client privilege."' 77 The commission asserted that "here the
receiving attorney is making purposeful efforts to probe for information
he or she knows or should know to be confidential and not to have been
Thus, the
knowingly communicated by opposing counsel."'7
commission found it "beyond dispute" that "such conduct is dishonest
and designed to prejudice the administration of justice."1 79 Therefore,
the Maine ethics commission found "that an attorney may not ethically
take steps to uncover metadata, embedded in an electronic document
sent by counsel for another party, in an effort to detect information that
is legally confidential and is or should be reasonably known not to have
been intentionally communicated." 8 0
C. Ethics Opinions Taking a Middle-of-the-Road Approach to Attorneys
Viewing Metadata in Documents Transmittedby Opposing Counsel
Several ethics panels have taken more nuanced positions, falling
between the opinions allowing attorneys to view metadata in documents
received from opposing counsel under all circumstances and those
absolutely prohibiting such activity. For example, the Pennsylvania Bar
Association on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded
that each attorney "must determine for himself or herself whether to
utilize the metadata contained in documents and other electronic files
based upon the lawyer's judgment and the particular factual
situation."' 8 1 In making this determination, the committee found that an
attorney should consider "the nature of the information received, how
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Pa. B. Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 2007-500, 2007
WL 5314341 (2007).
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and from whom the information was received, attorney-client privilege
and work product rules, and common sense, reciprocity and professional
courtesy."182
The committee began by expressing that "[b]ecause the problems
with metadata have become increasingly common, and because the
software that permits review of the data is inexpensive and easy to use,
the ability to discover and utilize metadata presents serious challenges
to the protection of the confidentiality of information provided by
counsel."' 83 The Pennsylvania panel went on to note that under
Pennsylvania ethics rules, specifically Rules 1.6 and 4.4(b), "it is
possible to conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
determined that attorneys in Pennsylvania who receive inadvertently
disclosed documents have an ethical obligation to promptly notify the
sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures."l 84
Furthermore, the committee noted that "[t]he absence of a specific Rule
addressing the inadvertent disclosure of metadata may also be viewed as
analogous to the inadvertent disclosure of a document and not an act
consciously undertaken by counsel." 8 5
After reviewing the differing positions taken by other jurisdictions
on the question of attorney review of metadata and noting that "each
offers a persuasive rationale," the committee stated that "it would be
difficult to establish a rule applicable in all circumstances and that,
consequently, the final determination of how to address the inadvertent
disclosure of metadata should be left to the individual attorney and his
or her analysis of the applicable facts." 86
The Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board in a
March 2010 opinion adopted a similar case-by-case approach indicating
that "[w]hether and when a lawyer may be advised to look or not to
look for such metadata is a fact specific question beyond the scope of
this Opinion."' 8 7 However, the panel did recognize that sending
attorneys had a duty to take "reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure
of confidential metadata" when transmitting electronic documents to
opponents. 1 The panel stated:
Competence requires that lawyers who use electronic documents
understand that metadata is created in the generation of electronic
documents, that transmission of electronic documents will
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minn. Law. Prof Resp. Board, Op. 22 (2010).
Id.
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include transmission of metadata, that recipients of the
documents can access metadata, and that actions can be taken to
prevent or minimize the transmission of metadata.' 8 9
Moreover, the opinion concluded that "the duty imposed by Rule 4.4(b)
[to notify a sender of a document that a receiving attorney knows or
reasonably should know was sent inadvertently] extends to metadata in
electronic documents."' 90 The panel noted, though, that the comment to
Minnesota Rule 4.4(b), which appeared to follow closely the language
of both the text and commentary to Model Rule 4.4(b), indicated that
the rule did not necessarily require an attorney to return inadvertently
sent material back to the sending attorney. 19 '
The opinion of the District of Columbia Legal Ethics Committee on
this issue presented a slightly different position than that taken by the
Pennsylvania and Minnesota ethics panels. The D.C. ethics panel
concluded that "[a] receiving lawyer is prohibited from reviewing
metadata sent by an adversary only where he [or she] has actual
knowledge that the metadata was inadvertently sent."l 92 In analyzing
the duties of the receiving attorney, the panel first noted that "[m]ore
often than not, the exchange of metadata between lawyers is either
mutually helpful or otherwise harmless." 9 3 The committee stated,
"Lawyers routinely exchange contracts, stipulations, and other
documents that include 'track changes' or other software features which
highlight suggested modifications." 94 Nevertheless, the committee
noted that the New York ethics panel concluded that Rule 8.4(c), which
prohibits attorneys from engaging in dishonest activity, applied to a
receiving attorney viewing metadata.195 The committee stated, "In our
view, however, Rule 8.4 is implicated only when the receiving lawyer
has actual prior knowledge that the metadata was inadvertently
provided."1 9 The committee explained:
Given the ubiquitous exchange of electronic documents and the
sending lawyers' obligation to avoid inadvertent productions of
metadata, we believe that mere uncertainty by the receiving
lawyer as to the inadvertence of the sender does not trigger an
ethical obligation by the receiving lawyer to refrain from
189. Id.
190. Id.
19 1. Id.
192. D.C. B. Ethics Committee, Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for
lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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reviewing the metadata.197
The committee elucidated that "[a] receiving lawyer may have such
actual prior knowledge if he is told by the sending lawyer of the
inadvertence before the receiving lawyer reviews the document." 98
Furthermore, "[s]uch actual knowledge may also exist where a
receiving lawyer immediately notices upon review of the metadata that
it is clear that protected information was unintentionally included."l 99
The committee stated that such situations "will be fact-dependent" but
could arise "where the metadata includes a candid exchange between an
adverse party and his lawyer such that it is 'readily apparent on its face'
that it was not intended to be disclosed." 2 00
However, the D.C. ethics panel also noted that D.C. Rule 4.4(b) is
broader than Model Rule 4.4(b) in that it not only requires an attorney
to notify the sender upon receiving an inadvertent writing but also
requires the attorney to "not examine the writing" and to "abide by the
instructions of the sending party regarding the return or destruction of
the writing." 20 1 Moreover, while noting that Rule 4.4(b) addressed "the
inadvertent disclosure of entire documents," the committee found "no
reason why it would not also apply to an inadvertently transmitted
portion of a writing that is otherwise intentionally sent." 202
Similarly, the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board in its recent
legal ethics opinion concluded "if a lawyer has received electronic
documents and has actual knowledge that metadata was inadvertently
sent, the receiving lawyer should not review the metadata before
consulting with the sending lawyer to determine whether the metadata
includes work-product or confidences." 203 The West Virginia opinion
cited to the prior opinion from the ethics committee of the New York
State Bar Association as support for this conclusion. 2 04 The West
Virginia panel explained that "[w]here a lawyer knows that privileged
information was inadvertently sent, it could be a violation of Rule 8.4(c)
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id (citations omitted) (quoting the D.C. Bar's Legal Ethics Committee, 2002 opinion
dealing with the disclosure of privileged material by a third party) D.C. B. Ethics Committee,
Op. 318 (2002), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_1awyers/ethics/legal-ethics/opinions/
opinion318.cfm.
201. Id. (quoting D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/rules of professionalconduct/amended r
ules/rulefour/rule04 04.cfn).
202. Id.
203. W. Va. Law. Disciplinary Board, Op. 2009-01 (2009), available at http://www.
wvodc.org/pdflei/LEI%2009-0l.pdf.
204. Id.
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for the receiving lawyer to review and use it without consulting with the
sender." 205 Unfortunately, the panel did not explain or define when an
attorney "knows" or has "actual knowledge" that the sending attorney
inadvertently included information in the metadata of an electronic
document transmitted to an opposing attorney.
The opinion went on to state that "[i]n many situations, it may not be
clear whether the disclosure was inadvertent." 206 Then with little
explanation, the panel suggested that "[i]n order to avoid
misunderstandings, it is always safer to notify the sender before
searching electronic documents for metadata. If attorneys cannot agree
on how to handle the matter, either lawyer may seek a ruling from a
court or other tribunal on the issue."207 In conclusion, the opinion stated
that "there is a burden on a lawyer receiving inadvertently provided
metadata to consult with the sender and abide by the sender's
instructions before reviewing such metadata." 208
Finally, the Arizona Bar Committee on the Rules of Professional
Conduct presented yet another variation in its opinion dealing with
whether it is ethical for receiving attorneys to view metadata in
electronic documents. The committee concluded that except in
specifically delineated situations set out in the opinion "the recipient
lawyer has a corresponding duty not to 'mine' the document for
metadata that may be embedded therein or otherwise engage in conduct
which amounts to an unjustified intrusion on the client-lawyer
relationship that exists between the opposing party and his or her
counsel."2 9 Nevertheless, the committee recognized an exception to
this duty when metadata is "discovered by the recipient through
inadvertent or relatively innocent means, such as right-clicking a mouse
or by holding the cursor over certain text in the document." 210 The
committee further stated, "We do not mean to imply that all such
activity necessarily rises to a level of ethical concern." 2 11 However,
even if the receiving attorney discovered metadata through such
"innocent means" and "knows or reasonably should know that the
sender did not intend to transmit the information, the recipient has a
duty to follow the procedures set forth in ER 4.4(b),"2 12 which are
discussed below.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Ariz. B. Committee on Rules Prof. Conduct, Op. 07-03 (2007), available at
http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfin?id-695.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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The committee also noted that "there is a significant difference
between the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ... and the Rules of
Professional Conduct as adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court." 213
Although Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) requires, like
Model Rule 4.4(b),2 14 an attorney, who receives a document from the
other side inadvertently, to promptly notify the sender, the Arizona rule
additionally requires the receiving attorney to "preserve the status quo
for a reasonable period of time in order to permit the sender to take
protective measures." 215 Furthermore, a footnote in the opinion
acknowledged the stance of the District of Columbia ethics panel, as set
out above, requiring actual knowledge on the part of the receiving
attorney that the sending attorney inadvertently included the metadata in
order for the receiving attorney to be prohibited from viewing the
metadata.216 However, the committee stated that it disagreed with this
conclusion. 2 17 The committee stated that except in the circumstances
explicitly set out in the opinion:
a lawyer who receives an electronic communication should not
be engaged in the intentional examination of a document's
metadata in the first place and, in our view, would bear the
burden of establishing that any such intentional examination was
for a proper purpose and not for the purpose of attempting to
discover any confidential or privileged information that might be

contained therein. 2 18
Therefore, while the Arizona opinion stopped short of absolutely
prohibiting a receiving attorney from ever examining metadata, it
presumably recognized much fewer situations in which such conduct
was ethically permissible than other opinions described in this category.
V. WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WORK-PRODUCT
PROTECTION FOR METADATA THROUGH INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
Because the inclusion of attorney-client privilege or work-product
information in the metadata of an electronic document forwarded to
213. Id.
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.

org/cpr/mrpc/rule 4_4.html.
215. Ariz. B. Committee on Rules Prof. Conduct, Op. 07-03 (2007), supra note 209
(quoting ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.myazbar.

org/Ethics/ruleview.cfin?id=48).
216. Id. n.1.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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opposing counsel potentially waives such protection, the current state of
the law concerning inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged
or work-product protected information needs to be examined. In the fall
of 2008, the U.S. Congress, by enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 502,
adopted a uniform approach for all federal court proceedings concerning
whether or not counsel's inadvertent disclosure of material waived the
protection of the attorney-client privilege or the work-product
doctrine. 2 19 Rule 502(b) states that "[w]hen made in a Federal
proceeding or to a Federal office or agency, the [inadvertent] disclosure
does not operate as a waiver" as long as "the holder of the privilege or
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and the holder
promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error." 220 The rule adopted
what has become known as the middle-of-the-road approach to
inadvertent disclosures of material potentially waiving the attorneyclient privilege. 221
Prior to the adoption of Rule 502, the majority of federal courts used
this test.222 In determining whether the holder of the privilege waived
the attorney-client privilege by inadvertently producing a document to
the opposing side, courts applying the middle-of-the-road balancing test
219. See FED. R. EviD. 502.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at
*3 (D. N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (stating that "FRE 502(b) opts for a middle ground approach to
determine if an inadvertent disclosure operates as a waiver" and a five-factor balancing test to
determine if a waiver occurred in the case); Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 428-29 (D.
N.J. July 24, 2009) (stating that "FRE 502(b) opts for a middle ground approach to determine if
an inadvertent disclosure operates as a waiver" and applying a five-factor balancing test to
determine if a waiver occurred in the case); Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp. v. Humana,
Inc., 258 F.R.D. 684, 690 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2009) (finding "there is no substantive difference
between [the relevant circumstances test for inadvertent disclosures and the Rule 502 test]"
because both tests "direct the Court to consider . .. the reasonableness of the precautions taken
to prevent the disclosure as well as the reasonableness of the steps taken to rectify the error" and
"two elements of the relevant circumstances test-the number of inadvertent disclosures and the
extent of the disclosures-are implicitly incorporated into the Rule 502 test . . . ."). See also
FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note ("The rule opts for the middle ground: inadvertent
disclosure of protected communications or information in connection with a federal proceeding
or to a federal office or agency does not constitute a waiver if the holder took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure and also promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error"); 8 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

2016.3 (3d ed. 2010) ("Evidence

Rule 502(b) resolved these differences in treatment of inadvertent disclosure waiver and adopted
a version of the majority multifactor treatment of the issues.").
222. FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note ("This position is in accord with the
majority view on whether inadvertent disclosure is a waiver."); see also 8 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016.3 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that "[m]ost
courts . . . . commonly looked to a series of factors in deciding whether to hold a given

disclosure should be regarded as waiving the privilege that would otherwise attach to the
materials produced.").
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examined: (1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent
disclosure considering the total number of documents produced, (2) the
total number of disclosures, (3) the extent of the disclosures, (4) the
promptness of efforts to remedy the disclosure, and (5) the overriding
Historically, courts have made such
interests of fairness and justice.
determinations on a case-by-case basis according to the particular facts
of the case concerned. 224 Courts have applied a similar balancing test
when examining whether an inadvertent disclosure waived the
applicability of the work-product doctrine to materials. 225 Rule 502 does
not set out exactly what constitutes "reasonable precautions to prevent
disclosure" or how prompt the holder of the privilege has to be in taking
"reasonable steps to rectify the error."22 Therefore, the case law
223. See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d
371, 388 (7th Cir. 2008); Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996); Alldread v. City
of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993); Figueras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth.,
250 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D.P.R. 2008); Maldonado v. New Jersey, 225 F.R.D. 120, 128 (D. N.J.
2004); Scott v. Glickman, 199 F.R.D. 174, 178 (E.D. N.C. 2001).
224. See, e.g., Alldread, 988 F.2d at 1434 (describing the middle-of-the-road approach as
"permit[ting] the court to consider the circumstances surrounding a disclosure on a case-by-case
basis"); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 242 F.R.D. 491, 494 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating
that the "balancing test ... provides maximum flexibility based on the individual facts of any
case"); Scott, 199 F.R.D. at 177 ("Many courts faced with this issue have adopted a middle
approach between these two polar opposites by examining several factors to determine if the
privilege should be deemed waived under the particular circumstances presented.").
225. See, e.g., Employer's Reinsurance Corp. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 422,
428 (D. Kan. 2003) ("Courts in this district apply a five-factor test to determine whether the
inadvertent disclosure of a document constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or of
work-product protection. These five factors include: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of
discovery; (4) the extent of disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness."); Sanner v. Bd.
of Trade of Chi., 181 F.R.D. 374, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (using a balancing test that weighed "(1)
the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent the disclosure, (2) the time taken to
rectify the error, (3) the scope of the discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) the
overriding issue of fairness" to determine whether the inadvertent disclosure of a document
waived work-product protection).
A common issue is whether work product protection is waived by disclosing
the document to a third party . . . . [I]f the disclosure to the third party is

inadvertent, the court considers (1) whether the party seeking discovery of the
documents was misled by the disclosure, or relied on the disclosure to its
detriment, (2) the reasonableness of the precautions the party claiming the
privilege took to prevent accidental disclosure, (3) the amount of time it took
that party to notice its error, and (4) the overriding interest of fairness and
justice. Some courts also consider the scope of the discovery and, in particular,
the material inadvertently disclosed in relation to the amount of material sought
through discovery.
6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

226. FED. R. EvID. 502(b).

26.70[6][c] (3d ed. 2010).
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decided prior to the enactment of Rule 502, applying the middle-of-theroad approach, remains relevant to interpreting Rule 502.227
Prior to Rule 502's enactment, some courts had taken the view that
only the client's intentional relinquishment of the attorney-client
privilege could waive that specific privilege.2 28 Therefore, under this
position, counsel's inadvertent disclosure of privileged material would
never waive the attorney-client privilege. 229 Other courts have taken the
view to the other extreme, where inadvertent disclosure of privileged
material would always waive the attorney-client privilege because the
disclosure would breach confidentiality and such a breach could never
be reversed. 2 30 Although Rule 502 would supersede the federal case
227. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

2016.3 (3d

ed. 2010) ("[T]he pre-2008 case law remains pertinent to application of this rule [from Federal
Rule of Evidence 502]."). However, at least one set of commentators has noted that Rule 502
"does not explicitly invoke the 'overriding issue of fairness."' Id. Nevertheless, "notions of
fairness necessarily inform the determination courts must make under the rule's criteria." Id.
228. See, e.g., Berg Elecs. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995) ("The court
finds the rule of law established by these cases that look to intent best serves the interests of the
attorney-client privilege, as it protects the client from the apprehension that consultations with
their legal advisors will be inadvertently disclosed and applies the privilege in a way that is
predictable and certain."); Kan.-Neb. Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21
(D. Neb. 1985) ("[T]he failure to catch this particular document prior to its production was in all
probability not a deliberate act, or even the result of a conscious but erroneous decision. I
therefore conclude that the privileged character which attached to the document as a result of the
original communication which it apparently describes, has not been waived, and the deponents,
therefore, will not be directed to respond to the line of questioning about the document, or about
the meeting."); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("We
are taught from first year of law school that waiver imports the 'intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.' Inadvertent production is the antithesis of that concept.").
229. See, e.g., Berg Elecs., 875 F. Supp. at 263 ("As the court has found the production was
inadvertent, it concludes Molex has not waived the privilege that protects these documents from
disclosure in discovery."); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938
(S.D. Fla. 1991) ("However, we believe the better reasoned rule is that ... mere inadvertent
production by the attorney does not waive the client's privilege."); Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at
954 ("But the better-reasoned rule is that mere inadvertent production does not waive the
privilege.").
230. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The courts will
grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant.
We therefore agree with those courts which have held that the privilege is lost 'even if the
disclosure is inadvertent."') (quoting In re Grand-Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th
Cir. 1984)); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) ("Once
persons not within the ambit of the confidential relationship have knowledge of the
communication, that knowledge cannot be undone. One cannot 'unring' a bell. . . . Therefore,
although Plaintiff produced the memorandum inadvertently, it waived its privilege in the
document when opposing counsel reviewed it."); Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
120 F.R.D. 445, 449, 450 (D. Mass. 1988) ("It cannot be doubted that the confidentiality of the
document has been destroyed by the 'inadvertent' disclosure no less than if the disclosure had
been purposeful; it equally cannot be doubted that the confidentiality of the communication can
never be restored, regardless of whether the disclosure was 'inadvertent' or purposeful ... I rule
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authority using these two contrary views, state jurisdictions presumably
could choose to apply either of these tests or the middle-of-the-road
balancing test.
Under the middle-of-the-road test adopted by Congress in Rule 502,
an attorney who left confidential communications from a client or
another associated attorney in the metadata of an electronic document
transmitted to opposing counsel arguably would have waived any
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection for such
communications. 31 Metadata containing such communications most
likely would be contained in comments left over in the commenting
function of the word processing software. A sending attorney could go
in and mechanically delete such information prior to sending the
electronic document to opposing counsel. The sending attorney also
could make sure that such communications were not contained in the
electronic file by having the document scanned into a PDF format,
which still would allow for electronic transmission to opposing counsel
but would omit such comments. The sending attorney could also use a
software program that removes or "scrubs" metadata prior to
transmission of the document.
Furthermore, in the context contemplated by this Article, where two
opposing attorneys are negotiating over the terms of a contract, the
sending attorney would not be screening or eliminating the metadata
from a voluminous number of documents, which is often the situation
when inadvertent disclosures occur during discovery in litigation. Very
likely, the sending attorney would be concerned with "scrubbing" the
metadata of just one document-the contract being forwarded to
opposing counsel. Considering that the sending attorney would be
sending only one document, his or her failure to remove metadata
containing confidential client communications or attorney work-product
would not constitute taking "reasonable steps to prevent disclosure" 232
of such information. Therefore, this very important factor would likely
indicate that the disclosure of the attorney-client privileged or workproduct protected information to opposing counsel waived any such
protection.
The other factor that Rule 502 expressly sets out, whether the sender
"promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error," 233 would vary
from situation to situation. However, even if the sending attorney did
take quick action to assert the attorney-client privileged or work-product
that disclosure of documents protected by the attorney-client privilege in the course of pre-trial
discovery ... operates as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to any documents disclosed
by 'inadvertence."').
231. See FED. R. EvID. 502.
232. FED. R. EvID. 502(b).
233. Id.
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nature of the communications concerned in the metadata, the receiving
attorney would still have a viable argument that the sending attorney
waived any protection for the communications concerned due to his or
her initial failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the inclusion
of such communications in the electronic document's metadata.
Furthermore, if including such information in metadata waives the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine,
this greatly diminishes the interest in keeping the receiving attorney
from viewing this information in order to promote the values of client
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.2 34

VI. ARGUMENTS

FOR ALLOWING RECEIVING ATTORNEYS TO
VIEW METADATA

This section sets out arguments for allowing attorneys, under most
circumstances, to view metadata contained in a document forwarded by
an opposing attorney. First, a person often times can easily access the
metadata that would contain the most sensitive information, such as
confidential client communications and attorney work-product.235
Therefore, attorneys many times will not have to take extraordinary
measures or engage in nefarious conduct, such as using sophisticated
computer software or programs, in order to view client communications
and attorney work-product contained in the metadata of an electronic
document. Second, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not
contain any language that requires an attorney to refrain from viewing
the metadata contained in an electronic document forwarded by
opposing counsel.2 3 6 Model Rule 4.4(b) does require, however, that an
attorney receiving an electronic document notify opposing counsel
when the attorney discovers information that he or she should know that
opposing counsel inadvertently left in the metadata of the document.237
Third, an attorney viewing metadata is not the type of egregious
conduct to which discipline authorities appropriately should apply
Model Rule 8.4(d)'s general prohibition of conduct "prejudicial to the
administration of justice." 238 Fourth, allowing receiving attorneys to
view the metadata contained in electronic documents forwarded by
opposing counsel will provide sending attorneys with an increased
incentive to put in place procedures that ensure that sensitive
234. See infra notes 257-58.
235. See infra Part VI.A.
236. See infra Part VI.B.
237. See infra notes 246-47.
238. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/rule_8_4.html; see also infra Part VI.C.
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information is removed from metadata prior to sending electronic
documents. 23 9 Providing sending attorneys with such an incentive,
ultimately, should decrease the exposure of confidential client
communications and attorney work-product to opponents in the
metadata of electronic documents.
Thus, unless an attorney has taken extraordinary measures to
recreate and review metadata that the sender initially deleted, attorney
disciplinary authorities generally should not punish lawyers who review
metadata contained in electronic documents forwarded by opposing
counsel. However, once the receiving attorney finds that the metadata
contains
sensitive
information,
either
confidential
client
communications or attorney work-product, and the attorney should
realize that the opposing attorney included such information
inadvertently, the receiving attorney should inform opposing counsel of
this discovery.
A. A Person Often Can Easily Access Important Metadata
To start, as noted by several ethics panels, often a person can easily
access metadata. 24 For example, if not deleted, a person can easily
access information contained in the "Comments" function by simply
turning that function on in his or her word processing software.2 41 Once
that function is turned on, a reader can discover the source of a
particular comment simply by placing the cursor over the comment,
which usually provides the name of the person who left the comment
and the day and time that person made the comment. Furthermore, the
"Comments" function would contain the metadata with the most
sensitive information because the "Comments" function allows people
reviewing the electronic document to include their own full sentence
comments and would be the most susceptible to containing confidential
client communications and attorney work-product. Thus, a receiving
attorney would not have to take extraordinary measures in order to
access the word processing function that is most likely to contain the
most important metadata.
Nevertheless, ethics panels that have concluded that attorneys should
not view metadata present the view that a reader can access metadata
only through extraordinary and nefarious methods. For example, the
New York ethics panel in its 2001 opinion spoke of "[m]odern
computer technology" that allows "sophisticated users" to obtain

239. See infra Part VI.D.
240. See supra notes 98, 170, 183 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (describing the "Comments" function in
Microsoft Word).
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metadata in electronic documents.242 However, as noted above, it is
relatively easy to access the "Comments" function in word processing
software.
Moreover, the New York opinion went on to discuss activity that is
more egregious and clandestine than merely accessing the metadata of
an electronic document. The New York ethics panel mentioned an
attorney placing a "bug" in an e-mail which would allow the sending
attorney to discover to whom the recipient forwarded the e-mail and the
electronic comments that those people subsequently made about the email.24 3 Yet, this type of activity goes well beyond an attorney simply
turning on the "Comments" function on his or her own word processing
software prior to examining an electronic version of a contract sent by
opposing counsel. Despite this, ethics opinions concluding that
attorneys should not view metadata continue to cite the opinion of the
New York ethics panel without recognizing this distinction.
Additionally, many of those opinions continue to share the view that
an attorney necessarily must go to extraordinary measures to access
metadata. For example, among other scenarios, the New Hampshire
ethics panel stated that a "receiving lawyer may use sophisticated
software to reveal or recover information not revealed by most
programs. ,,244 Similarly, the Maine ethics panel discussed, among other
situations, that some attorneys may not be aware of how metadata "may
be subject to being probed by someone using extraordinary but
technologically available methods."2 4 5 While extraordinary measures,
such as sophisticated software and computer programs, may be able to
retrieve previously deleted metadata, ethics panels should not equate the
conduct of attorneys who take extraordinary measures and engage in
nefarious activity to detect material thought to be expunged with the
conduct of receiving attorneys who simply turn on the "Comments"
function of their word processing program under the mistaken
assumption that the information located in the metadata was included
intentionally. The two types of behavior are distinguishable, and thus, a
blanket ban on any attorney viewing of metadata goes too far.

242. N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfim?Section=EthicsOpinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=6533.
243. Id.
244. N.H. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009), available at
http://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdflEthicsOpinion2008-9-4.pdf
245. Me. Prof. Ethics Commission Board Overseers Bar, Op. 196 (2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar-overseersethics_opinions&id=
63337&v-article.
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B. No Language in the Model Rules Requires an Attorney to
Refrainfrom Viewing Metadata
Not only can relatively simple means reveal sensitive information in
metadata, but the Model Rules do not contain any language that
necessarily prohibits an attorney from viewing metadata or any
inadvertently produced confidential communications no matter its form.
The most closely applicable rule, Model Rule 4.4(b), states that an
attorney who receives a document that he or she "knows or reasonably
should know" that another person inadvertently sent must only
"promptly notify the sender." 24 Moreover, the comment to the Rule in
paragraph two defines the term "document" to include "e-mail or other
electronic modes of transmission subject to be read or put into readable
form." 24 7 Therefore, from the language of the rule, it seems clear that
once an attorney views metadata contained in an electronic document
forwarded by opposing counsel and realizes that it contains confidential
communication from opposing counsel's client or the opinions of
another attorney working with opposing counsel, the receiving attorney
has a duty to inform the sending attorney of this discovery. However,
this does not mean that the receiving attorney has a duty to refrain from
viewing the metadata in the first place.
Moreover, the comment to Rule 4.4 in paragraph three states that
lawyers may choose to return an inadvertently sent document "unread"
only if "the lawyer learns before receivin the document that it was
inadvertently sent to the wrong address." 48 This would not be the
situation in the hypothetical posed by this Article where the receiving
attorney only discovers confidential client communications in the
metadata of the lease agreement received from the other side upon
actually accessing the metadata contained in that document.
Furthermore, the comment to Rule 4.4 in paragraph two further states
that "[w]hether the lawyer is required to take additional steps . . . is a

matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of
whether the privileged status of a document has been waived."24 9
Therefore, the most applicable Model Rule does not set out a duty to
refrain from viewing sensitive information prior to learning that it was
sent to the attorney inadvertently, or even subsequent to this discovery.
246. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.

org/cpr/mrpc/rule 4_4.html.
247. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010), available at http://www.

abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4_comm.html.
248. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2010), available at http://www.

abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4comm.html.
249. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2010), available at http://www.

abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/nle_4_4_comm.htnil.
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According to Model Rule 4.4(b), the attorney only is required to notify
opposing counsel that the receiving attorney discovered the information
in the metadata of the electronic document.2so
Additionally, some jurisdictions in which ethics panels have held
that a receiving attorney should refrain from viewing metadata have a
version of Model Rule 4.4(b) that explicitly places more extensive
duties on the receiving attorney upon discovering an inadvertent
transmission than Model Rule 4.4(b). For example, the New Hampshire
ethics panel noted that New Hampshire's version of Rule 4.4(b) requires
an attorney not to examine materials upon discovering that the opposing
attorney had inadvertently sent such items.2 5 1 Similarly, although its
jurisdiction did not adopt a differently worded version of Rule 4.4(b),
the Maine ethics panel noted that Maine courts had held that an attorney
should not use confidential information inadvertently disclosed by
opposing counsel. 252 Also, although not adopting an all-out ban on the
viewing of metadata, the Arizona ethics panel noted that Arizona's
version of Rule 4.4(b) required the receiving attorney to "preserve the
status quo for a reasonable period of time in order to permit the sender
to take protective measures." 253
Furthermore, other Model Rules that are less applicable on their face
than Model Rule 4.4(b), but cited by some ethics panels in support of
prohibiting attorneys from viewing metadata, do not require attorneys to
refrain from viewing metadata. For example, although some ethics
panels have used the duty of confidentiality in Model Rule 1.6 as
authority for concluding that a receiving attorney should not view
metadata, Model Rule 1.6 places an affirmative duty on an attorney not
to disclose communications or information concerning his or her own
client.254 Neither the rule nor its comment mention a duty for attorneys
to guard against discovering confidential information of the opposing
attorney's client. 255 In fact, the comment to Rule 1.6 reinforces that the
250. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), availableat http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_4.html.
251. N.H. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009), available at http://www.
nhbar.org/uploads/pdflEthicsOpinion2008-9-4.pdf; see also supra text accompanying notes
152-56.
252. Me. Prof. Ethics Commission Board Overseers Bar, Op. 196 (2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic-mebar overseersethics_opinions&id=
63337&v-article; see also supra text accompanying note 177.
253. Ariz. B. Committee on Rules Prof. Conduct, Op. 07-03 (2007), available at
http://www.myazbar.orglEthics/opinionview.cfin?id=695 (quoting ARIz. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010), available at http://www.myazbar. org/Ethics/ruleview.cfi?id=48);
see also supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
254. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010), availableat http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/rule-1_6.html; see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
255. Id. cmt.; see D.C. B. Ethics Committee, Op. 256 (1995), available at
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duty of confidentiality set out therein, deals with an attorney's duty not
to disclose his or her own client's information by stating, "[t]his Rule
governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the
representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the
client."2 56
Moreover, the fact that a credible argument exists that the sending
attorney waived any attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine
protection by including the communication concerned in the metadata
of the electronic document sent to the receiving attorney buttresses the
argument that the receiving attorney should be able to view the
metadata concerned. A sending attorney could fairly easily remove
metadata containing confidential client communications or the thoughts
or opinions of other associated attorneys if he or she takes reasonable
precautionary measures prior to transmitting the electronic document.2 5 7
Therefore, the inclusion of such communications in the document's
metadata likely waives any attorney-client privilege or work-product
doctrine protection. 258 If any applicable privilege or work-product
doctrine protection has been waived for the metadata concerned, then
arguably there is no more interest in having the receiving attorney
attempt to further preserve the confidentiality of such information.
Finally, at least one ethics panel has stated that if a receiving
attorney fails to examine the metadata contained in an electronic
document this may violate Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3, which require an
attorney to "provide competent representation to a client" 259 and to act
"with

reasonable

diligence

. .

. in

representing

a

client" 260

respectively. 26 ' Thus, if an attorney refrains from looking at metadata in
order to avoid violating some supposed implicit duty to refrain from
1.6
("Rule
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion256.cfrn
(Confidentiality of Information) is obviously inapplicable to the conduct of the receiving
lawyer, as it only governs a lawyer's disclosure and use of confidences and secrets of the
lawyer's client. We see no other Rule applicable to this situation which would prohibit use of
the document."); Ohio Board Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 93-11 (1993),
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/I 993/
at
available
op%2093-011 .doc ("[W]ithin the Code, there is no express or implied duty to protect an
opposing party's confidences and secrets.").
256. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.6 cmt. 1 (2010), available at http://www.

abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6_comm.html.
257. See supratext accompanying notes 24-37, 232.
258. See supranotes 232-33 and accompanying text.
259. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.1 (2010), availableat http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/mrpc/ruleI_1 .html.
260. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/mrpc/rule_I_3.htmIl.
261. Vt. B. Ass'n Prof. Resp. Sec., Op. 2009-1 (2009), available at http://www.vtbar.org/
Upload%20Files/WebPages/Attorney/o2OResourcesfaeopinions/Advisory/o20Ethics%200pinio
ns/Electronic%20Documents/09-O1.pdf.
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discovering information imparted by a client of the opposing attorney,
the attorney may be violating his or her express duty to competently and
diligently represent his or her own client.
C. An Attorney Viewing Metadata is Not the Type ofEgregious Conduct
Normally PunishedUnder Model Rule 8.4(d)'s Prohibitionof Conduct
"Prejudicialto the Administration ofJustice"
Furthermore, ethics panels cannot appropriately apply Model Rule
8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct "prejudicial
to the administration of justice,"2 6 2 to attorneys viewing metadata in
electronic documents transmitted by opposing counsel because this
language is far too vague to punish conduct that is not egregious.
Several authorities have stated that jurisdictions should not apply their
versions of Model Rule 8.4(d) as the sole basis for attorney discipline
unless an attorney engages in particularly egregious behavior that
violates well accepted and understood norms of legal practice. 263 In this
manner, legal disciplinary authorities can avoid violating the Due
Process Clause because the vague language of the rule leaves attorneys
unaware of the type of conduct that it prohibits. 264
A survey of recent ethics and disciplinary opinions from various
jurisdictions available on Westlaw demonstrates several broad
categories of specific attorney conduct to which ethics panels
commonly have applied state versions of Model Rule 8.4(d). First,
ethics panels have applied the rule to situations in which attorneys have
failed to follow specific court procedures 26 5 or engaged in gross
incompetence in representing clients before a court, such as neglecting

262. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.

org/cpr/mrpc/rule_8_4.html; see also supranotes 60-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevant language from Rule 8.4(d) and how various jurisdictions and commentators have
interpreted this language).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 75.
264. See supra text accompanying note 74.
265. People v. Hunsaker, No. 04PDJO93, 2005 WL 1428532, at *1 (Colo. Office Presiding
Disciplinary Judge June 13, 2005) (holding that an attorney that had "failed to appear in court
and remained a fugitive from justice for six months" due to felony sex offenses constituted
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); People v. Pareja, No. 04PDJ107, 2004 WL
2926201, at *1 (Colo. Office Presiding Disciplinary Judge Nov. 29, 2004) (holding that failing
to pay attorney registration fee and then appearing in fifty cases as attorney of record for clients
constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); In re Petition for Disciplinary
Action Against Stanbury, 561 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1997) (holding that stopping payment of
check for court filing fees was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); N.C. Formal
Ethics Op. 5 (2006) (finding that attorney colluding with judge and prosecutor to avoid
application of a state required sentence act, in order to get client a shorter criminal sentence,
would constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
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cases filed for clients. 266 Second, ethics panels have applied the rule to
situations in which an attorney improperly takes possession of probative
Third,
evidence or falsifies or misrepresents testimony or evidence.
ethics panels have found that attorneys violate their jurisdiction's
version of Model Rule 8.4(d) by dissuading witnesses to testify in
court.2 6 8 Fourth, ethics panels have found that the rule prohibits local
officials or their law firms from engaging in certain legal
representations that create conflicts of interest concerns which the
conflicts of interest rules do not expressly cover. 269 Fifth, some ethics
266. See, e.g., People v. DeBauche, No. 06PDJO32, 2006 WL 1382422, at *1 (Colo. Office
Presiding Disciplinary Judge May 5, 2006) (holding that "recklessly neglect[ing] five client
matters, fail[ing] to adequately communicate with" two clients when such conduct "delayed the
outcomes in legal proceedings" constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice).
267. See, e.g., People v. Mazurek, No. 05PDJ047, 2005 WL 1428533, at *1 (Colo. Office
Presiding Discipl. J. June 13, 2005) (holding that attorney representing a client in a divorce
proceeding and misrepresenting "the client's financial situation to a court by stating that she was
required to pay legal fees which [the attorney] had actually refunded" constituted conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice); Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Brien, 899 N.E.2d 125,
128-29 (Ohio 2008) (holding that attorney's disbursement of funds from sale of real estate to
client after client had filed for bankruptcy violated Ohio Disciplinary Rule 1-1 02(A)(5), which
prohibited conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); N.C. St. B. Ethics, Op. 2 (2007),
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/ethics.asp?page=9&from=1/2007&to= 12/2007
at
available
(finding that an "[aittomey may not take possession of an item that is contraband nor may the
lawyer facilitate its transfer to any other person in furtherance of a crime" under North Carolina
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and that an attorney may even be able to disclose the
location of the contraband to authorities pursuant to Rule 8.4(d) "if the contraband is evidence in
the pending action against Defendant or the subject of a criminal investigation"); Or. St. B.
Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op. 2005-53, 2005 WL 5679642 (2005) (finding that attorney,
defending client from a driving with a suspended license violation, may not help client continue
to deceive court into believing that the client was the driver instead of his brother who actually
was driving the car when the ticket was issued); Or. St. B. Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op.
2005-15, 2005 WL 5679574 (2005) (finding that a "lawyer may not, however, accept evidence
of a crime, such as the murder weapon at issue here, unless the lawyer makes it available to the
prosecutor" under Oregon Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4).
268. See, e.g., People v. Quimby, No. 05PDJO08, 2005 WL 1199279, at *1 (Colo. Office
Presiding Disciplinary Judge Apr. 25, 2005) (holding that giving "legal advice to a witness
against [attorney's] client, which resulted in her failure to appear" constituted conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice); Or. St. B. Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op.
2005-132, 2005 WL 5679556 (2005) ("Attempting to persuade a witness not to testify would be
prejudicial to the administration of justice, because, if successful, it would obviously constitute
substantial harm to the functioning of the proceeding as well as the substantive interest of a
party.").
269. See, e.g., N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 798 (2006), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfmn?template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfmn&Content
ID-13650. ("A lawyer who is a member of a county legislature may not undertake criminal
representation in cases involving members of a police department or district attorney's office
over which the legislature has budget or appointment authority."); Ohio Board Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2008-5 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.
gov/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/2008//op_08-005.doc ("[T]o be consistent with the ethical
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panels have invoked the rule when attorneys make statements in
advertising for which they have little to no evidence to substantiate. 270
Finally, ethics panels have found that the rule prohibits attorneys
from settling both criminal and civil cases upon improper conditions
that impinge on litigants' rights to sue or bring administrative
complaints. These opinions deal primarily with two areas. One category
deals with prosecutors conditioning a plea agreement upon a criminal
defendant agreeing to release the locality from civil liability for conduct
of officers that occurred during the defendant's apprehension.271 The
duty to avoid conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, a lawyer who is associated in a
law firm with an assistant city director of law should not serve as court appointed counsel, a
public defender, or as co-counsel to a public defender."). In another situation dealing with
conflicts of interest, at least one ethics panel also has found that encouraging a client to engage
in conduct which will intentionally create conflicts of interest that will make it difficult for an
opponent to retain legal counsel is prejudicial to the administration of justice. N.J. Superior Ct.
Advisory Comm. Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 703 (2006) ("[A] practice under which a client was advised
to contact other lawyers for representation essentially on a pretextual basis, in order to
disqualify those lawyers from representation of an adversary" constituted conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice "in that it would impede a litigant's effective access to counsel of
choice.").
270. See, e.g., N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Committee Prof. Ethics, Op. 698, 2006 WL 1916398
(2005) ("There is no evidence of any factual basis for such statements. Absent such a basis, we
find that such references case baseless aspersions upon, and are prejudicial to the administration
of justice with the meaning of RPC 8.4(d)."); Ohio Board Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline, Op. 2008-5 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/
Advisory Opinions/2004//op%2004-012.doc (stating that "[a]n Ohio attorney's telephone
directory [that] created an impression that an out-of-state licensed attorney (who was not
licensed in Ohio) was an attorney associated with the Ohio attorney" constituted conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice) (citing Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Reed, 761 N.E.2d 9,
10 (Ohio 2002)).
271. See, e.g., N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Committee Prof. Ethics, Op. 698, 2008 WL 4790546
(2005) ("Threatening to or presenting criminal charges for [the purpose of obtaining an
improper advantage in a civil matter] is a form of intimidation and harassment that threatens the
integrity of the civil process and is prejudicial to the administration of justice."); S.C. B. Ethics
Advisory Committee, Op. 05-17, 2005 WL 3873352 (2005) ("While conditioning the dismissal
upon the waiver of civil redress may not directly violate Rule 4.5, it would violate Rule 8.4(e),
which prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The solicitor has the
power to summarily dismiss one or both charges against the defendant. This would require the
defendant to weigh the threat of jail against his right to seek civil redress for the alleged
improper conduct of the police."). Cf, e.g., N.C. St. B. Ethics, Op. 2 (2007) available at
("The threat to
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/ethics.asp?page=7&from=1/2005&to=12/2005
expose a party's undocumented immigration status serves no other purpose than to gain leverage
in the settlement negotiations for a civil dispute and furthers no legitimate interest of our
adjudicative system. Therefore, a lawyer may not use the threat of reporting an opposing party
or a witness to immigration officials in settlement negotiations on behalf of a client in a civil
matter."); but see, e.g., Or. St. B. Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op. 2005-139, 2005 WL
5679563 Or. Formal Op. 2005-139 (2005) (finding that a "[pirosecutors' threat of bringing more
serious charges if Defendant refuses to negotiate the case or files pretrial motions" does not
prejudice the administration of justice).
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other group of opinions deals with attorneys seeking to settle civil suits
with former clients conditioned upon the former client agreeing to not
file a complaint with state disciplinary authorities.2 7 2
An attorney viewing metadata left in a document sent by opposing
counsel does not fit neatly into the categories of conduct set out above
that ethics panels have found is prejudicial to the administration of
justice. To start, all of those categories of conduct, except for the
situations dealing with representations in attorney advertisements, are
much more directly related to the proper functioning of the litigation
process than an attorney examining the metadata contained in a
proposed contract forwarded by opposing counsel. Perhaps more
importantly, all of these categories deal with situations that clearly
relate to improper behavior. Neglecting clients' cases, failing to pay a
bar registration fee but still appearing in court on behalf of clients,
withholding substantive evidence from a tribunal, misrepresenting
evidence or testimony to a court, dissuading material witnesses from
testifying, applying pressure on an opposing party to give up his or her
right to bring another suit or administrative complaint in order to settle
an action, avoiding conflicts of interest, and even makin
misrepresentations in advertising all deal with "egregious behavior"2
on the part of the attorney involved and with violating "accepted
professional norms,, 274 or "conventions of practice., 275
Avoiding the examination of an opposing party's attorney-client
communications contained in the metadata of an electronic document
sent by opposing counsel is not a well-established norm of the practice
of law. The fact that a significant split of authority exists among
jurisdictions as to whether this conduct is appropriate demonstrates that
refraining from such conduct is not an established norm of practice. In
fact, such a situation involves very unclear duties on the part of the
attorney concerned and, therefore, is exactly the type of situation in
which ethics boards should not apply vague language such as that
prohibiting "conduct prejudicial to administration of justice."

272. See, e.g., People v. Haroldson, No. 08PDJO05, 2008 WL 748438, at *1 (Colo. Office
Presiding Disciplinary Judge Mar. 5, 2008) (holding that attorney who "settled a claim for
malpractice liability . . . engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by
including a requirement that his client waive any right to file a complaint with the People.");
S.C. B. Ethics Advisory Committee, Op. 05-17, 2005 WL 3873352 (2005) ("It is the opinion of
the Advisory Committee that an attorney who enters into, or attempts to enter into, a settlement
that includes a term that a party to the agreement will withdraw, refrain from filing, or decline to
cooperate regarding, a complaint under Supreme Court Rule 5 violates Rule 4-8.4(d) by
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.").
273. See supra text accompanying note 71.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 75.
275. See supra text accompanying note 75.

210

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. I 5

Furthermore, because a colorable argument exists that the inclusion
of such communications in an electronic document's metadata waives
any applicable attorney-client privilege or work-product protection,276
an attorney who examines such communications does not engage in
egregious behavior similar to bribin; jurors, suborning perjury or
making misrepresentations to a court.2 Rather, when the potential for
waiver is considered, it seems reasonable that an attorney should be able
to view such information. Therefore, ethics panels should not apply the
various state versions of Model Rule 8.4(d) prohibiting "conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice" to attorneys that examine
metadata that opposing counsel leaves in electronic documents, unless
the receiving attorney has taken extraordinary measures, such as using
sophisticated computer software or programs, to retrieve previously
deleted metadata.
Some ethics panels have also discussed whether their jurisdiction's
version of Model Rule 8.4(d) applies to situations where opposing
counsel has inadvertently disclosed attorney-client privileged
communications to the other side in contexts not involving metadata
and the receiving attorney utilizes such information. 27 8 However, most
opinions have found that an attorney may examine such
communications, in order to determine if the disclosure waived any
applicable privilege, and does not have to return the materials if a good
faith argument exists that the other side in fact waived the protection of
276. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying note 72.
278. See, e.g., Colo. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Formal Op. 108 (2000), available at
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfn/ID/386/subID/1830/CETH/Ethics-Opinion-108:-InadvertentDisclosure-of-Privileged-or-Confidential-Documents,-05/2 0/00-Col. Ethics Comm., Formal
Op. 108 (2000) ("[T]he Committee concludes that Rule 8.4(d) requires a lawyer to respect the
privileged and confidential status of documents belonging to non-clients in order to ensure the
orderly administration of justice."); N.Y. Committee on Prof. and Jud. Ethics, Formal Op.
2003-04, 2003 WL 23789274 (2003) ("[Wie conclude that a receiving lawyer has obligations
under the New York Code to notify, return and refrain from review of inadvertent disclosures,
particularly when considering the duties of lawyer not to engage in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, to preserve client confidences and secrets and to represent clients with
zeal but within the confines of the law."); Or. Formal Op. 2005-150 (2005) (stating that "[i]f
applicable court rules or substantive law require a lawyer to return documents as soon as the
lawyer realizes that they were inadvertently produced, a lawyer who does not do so would be
subject to discipline or disqualification on other grounds" and citing Oregon Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(4) prohibiting "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."); Utah St. B. Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee, Op. 99-01, 1999 WL 48784 (1999)
("[Tihe Committee's view is that an attorney in possession of an opposing party's attorneyclient communications for which the attorney-client privilege has not been intentionally waived
should advise opposing counsel of the fact of its disclosure, regardless of the specific facts
surrounding disclosure. We draw this conclusion primarily because to do otherwise would
be inconsistent with the standards of Rule 8.4(d).").
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the privilege.279 Some ethics panels have also examined whether an
279. See, e.g., D.C. B. Ethics Committee, Op. 256 (1995), available at http://www.dcbar.
org/for lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions/opinion256.cfim ("First, where the confidential
documents is received by opposing counsel with no indication that the disclosure was
inadvertent, and is read by opposing counsel before being otherwise informed of these
circumstances (as through a communication from the sending lawyer), we see no ethical
violation if the receiving lawyer retains the documents and uses the disclosed information."); Ill.
Advisory Opinion on Prof. Conduct, Op. 98-04, 1999 WL 35561 (1999) ("[T]he Committee
believes , as noted by the District of Colombia opinion, that there is not ethical prohibition
against the receiving lawyer using information obtained during the review of a document sent by
opposing counsel. . . . On the other hand, a lawyer should not review or use confidential
materials of an opposing party if the lawyer has notice of the inadvertent transmission before
opening or reviewing the materials in question."); Ky. B. Ass'n Committee on Ethics, Op. E374 (1995), available at http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba-e-374.pdf
("Lawyers are strongly urged to return such materials unread, but if case law permits a lawyer is
entitled to argue a good faith claim of 'waiver' before the court in which an action is pending.");
N.Y. Committee on Prof. and Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 2003-04, 2003 WL 23789274 (2003).
("[W]e acknowledge that there are limited circumstances where ethical rules alone do not bar
use of such information, particularly where . . . the receiving attorney has a good faith basis to
argue that inadvertent disclosure has resulted in waiver of a privilege or where the receiving
attorney has been exposed to confidential information prior to knowing or having reason to
know that the communication was misdirected."); Ohio Board Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline, Op. 93-11 (1993), availableat http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/
AdvisoryOpinions/1993/op%2093-011.doc ("[W]hen a lawyer conducts a public records
search prior to litigation and through no wrong doing obtains a copy of an inadvertently
disclosed memorandum that either on its face or upon closer examination appears to contain
information subject to the attorney-client privilege, there is no ethical duty to refrain from
reading the memorandum or to refrain from revealing the contents to the client; . . ."); Or. St. B.
Ass'n Board Governors, Formal Op. 2005-150, 2005 WL 5679575 (2005) ("The comment to
the ABA Model Rule [4.4(b)] also suggests that a lawyer's decision whether to return an
inadvertently sent document unread is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved the
lawyer in accordance with Oregon RPC 1.2 and 1.4."); Pa. B. Ass'n Committee on Legal Ethics
and Prof. Resp., Informal Op. 2005-22, 2005 WL 2291085 (2005) ("[T]here is no ethical
prohibition on the Inquirer's use of the information contained in the disclosure because here as
well that question is one of substantive law and not ethics."); Pa. B. Ass'n Committee on Legal
Ethics and Prof Resp., Informal Op. 99-150, 1999 WL 1458364 (1999) ("[T]here appears to be
no prohibition under the Rules and under the circumstances you described from reviewing the
contents of the package of documents at least to determine whether it appears that the
documents are or are not subject to a privilege."); Phila. B. Ass'n Prof. Guidance Committee,
Op. 94-3 (1994), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/Ethics0pinion943?appNum=2 ("Our opinion is that there is no violation of the Rules of Professional Guidance to
decline to return the document. Similarly, there is no ethical inhibition on your seeking to admit
the document at the time of trial."). See also ABA Committee on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal
Op. 05-437 (2005) ("Rule 4.4(b) thus only obligates the receiving lawyer to notify the sender of
the inadvertent transmission promptly. The rule does not require the receiving lawyer either to
refrain from examining the materials or to abide by the instructions of the sending lawyer.").
ABA Formal Opinion 05-437 formally withdrew ABA Formal Opinion 92-638, which had
found that an attorney who received attorney-client privileged materials inadvertently from an
opponent should refrain from examining such materials, notify the other side and abide by
opposing counsel's instructions as to what to do with the materials. Id. See also ABA
Committee on Ethics and Prof Resp., Formal Op. 92-368.
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attorney would engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice by taking possession of and examining materials containing an
opponent's attorney-client communications when a third party or the
attorney's client provided these communications to the attorney. 280
However, those situations are inapposite to instances where an attorney
fails to get rid of attorney-client communications or work-product
material contained in the metadata of an electronic document sent to an
opponent because they do not involve situations when the opposing
attorney directly transmitted the communications at issue to the
receiving attorney. The question of whether an attorney can examine the
other side's attorney-client communications provided by a third party
who may have obtained the communications illegitimately, and most
likely without the consent of the opposing side, is different from a
situation where the opposing side itself has disclosed such
communications and thereby waived any applicable attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection.
D. Allowing Receiving Attorneys to View Metadata Will Give Sending
Attorneys a Strong Incentive to be Vigilant in Removing Metadata
ContainingConfidential Communicationsand Attorney Work-Product
Attorneys that transmit documents in electronic form to opposing
counsel should be given a strong incentive to ensure that any
confidential client communications or work-product is removed from
the metadata contained in the document or file. Ethics panels that have
280. See, e.g., Fla. Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 07-1, 2007 WL 5404933 (2007)
(noting that "the inquiring attorney [who received documents improperly obtained by a client
from a litigation opponent] cannot engage in conduct involving dishonesty or that is considered
prejudicial to the administration of justice" and finding that "the inquiring attorney must inform
the client that the materials cannot be retained, reviewed or used without informing the
opposing party that the inquiring attorney and client have the documents at issue"); N.J. Sup.
Ct. Advisory Committee Prof. Ethics, Op. 698, 1995 WL 33971 (1995) ("For a lawyer to allow
a client's improper actions taken in the context of litigation to benefit that client in such
litigation would constitute 'conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice' under
RPC 8.4(d). Only disclosure to the adversary will avoid the prejudicial effect proscribed by this
rule, and thus this situation falls within those in which disclosure of confidential information is
permitted by RPC 1.6(c)(3) in order "to comply with other law."); N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee
on Prof. Ethics, Op. 700, 1998 WL 957912 (1998) ("Although the attorney did not solicit the
unauthorized communication or the breach of the former employee's duty of confidentiality, the
attorney may not exploit the willingness of the former employee to undermine the
confidentiality rule. The Code prohibits a lawyer from engaging in . . . "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." DR 1-102(A)(5)."); but see ABA Committee on
Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) ("It further is our opinion that if the
providing of the materials is not the result of the sender's inadvertence, Rule 4.4(b) does not
apply to the factual situation addressed in Formal Opinion 94-382. A lawyer receiving materials
under such circumstances is therefore not required to notify another party or that party's lawyer
of receipt as a matter of compliance with the Model Rules.").
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concluded that receiving attorneys should not view the metadata
contained in electronic documents or files transmitted by an opposing
attorney de-emphasize the sender's responsibility for failing to remove
confidential information in metadata that is easily accessed by a
receiving attorney, such as in the "Comments" or "Track Changes"
functions. While several of these panels have recognized that the
sending attorney has a duty to take measures to remove confidential
communications from metadata prior to transmitting the document to
the other side,2 8 ' prohibiting receiving attorneys from looking at
metadata under any circumstances provides little to no incentive for
sending attorneys to go through the trouble of removing easily
accessible confidential information or to set up procedures to ensure
that such information is removed routinely. Therefore, a prohibition on
receiving attorneys viewing metadata encourages the disclosure of
confidential client information rather than discouraging it.
Moreover, it often may be difficult for a sending attorney to detect
whether opposing counsel has accessed the metadata included in an
electronic document. So, sending attorneys should not be given a false
sense of security that the receiving attorney will not access
inadvertently included metadata information, when very simple steps
will allow access to this information. Contrastingly, if ethics panels
allow receiving attorneys to view easily accessible metadata contained
in electronic documents, the sending attorney is on notice that opposing
counsel may access any confidential communications or attorney workproduct information included in metadata. This will provide sending
attorneys with the proper incentive to adopt procedures and methods to
remove and eliminate such information prior to sending a document to
281. Ala. St. B. Off. Gen. Couns., Op. 2007-02 (2007), available at http://www.alabar.
org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneld=412 ("[T]he Commission believes that an attorney has an
ethical duty to exercise reasonable care when transmitting electronic documents to ensure that
he or she does not disclose his or her client's secrets and confidences."); Fla. Committee on
Prof. Ethics, Op. 06-2, 2006 WL 5865322 (2006) ("It is the sending lawyer's obligation to take
reasonable steps to safeguard the confidentiality of all communications sent by electronic
means to other lawyers and third parties . . . , including information contained in metadata
.... ); Me. Prof. Ethics Commission Board Overseers Bar, Op. 196 (2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic-mebar-overseers ethics opinions&id=
63337&v-article ("[W]e agree with the other jurisdictions that attorneys are ethically required
to take reasonable measures to avoid communication of confidential information, regardless of
the mode of transmission."); N.H. B. Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009),
("The Ethics
available at http://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdflEthicsOpinion2008-9-4.pdf
Committee agrees that a sending lawyer who transmits electronic documents or files has a duty
to use reasonable care to guard against disclosure of metadata that might contain confidential
information."); N.Y. St. B. Ass'n Committee on Prof. Ethics, Op. 782, 2004 WL 3021157
(2004) ("Lawyers have a duty under DR 4-101 to use reasonable care when transmitting
documents by e-mail to prevent the disclosure of metadata containing client confidences or
secrets.").
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opposing counsel. This will provide more security to confidential
communications and attorney work-product than if such information
continues to be included in metadata and receiving attorneys are
penalized for their mistaken discovery of such information or simply
told not to exercise their natural curiosity and duty of diligence.
E. Application ofPrinciplesto Article's Hypothetical
Therefore, a jurisdiction should not find that the attorney involved in
the hypothetical situation presented at the beginning of this Article
acted unethically. The attorney was able to access the client and
attorney comments simply by enabling the "Comments" function in the
word processing software that was used to view the lease agreement
forwarded by opposing counsel. The attorney did not have to use
sophisticated computer software to recreate previously deleted
information to view the metadata involved. Furthermore, the receiving
attorney had reason to believe that opposing counsel may have intended
to include commentary for her benefit in the "Comments" bubbles due
to past practice. Therefore, it was more than reasonable for her to access
the information contained in that part of the electronic document.
Even if that was not the situation, a jurisdiction should not find that
the attorney's viewing of the metadata in the electronic document was
unethical. To start, the ease with which the attorney was able to access
the information indicates that her conduct was not dishonest or
nefarious. Furthermore, a good argument exists that opposing counsel
waived any attorney-client privilege and any work-product protection
that applied to the communications from the client and from associated
counsel respectively because it did not appear that opposing counsel had
attempted to eliminate either communication from the document's
metadata. Therefore, any concerns about preserving confidentiality were
illusory.
Nevertheless, after discovering the communications from the
opposing client and from the attorney associated with opposing counsel,
the attorney should notify opposing counsel that she discovered these
communications in the document's metadata. Opposing counsel then, at
the very least, will be aware of the information that the receiving
attorney now has, and this will prevent the receiving attorney from
using the information surreptitiously during negotiations over the lease
agreement. Opposing counsel also can attempt to have a court declare
that such information is privileged or covered by the work-product
doctrine, depending on the communication concerned. However, in this
situation since the parties are not already involved in litigation, the
attorney would have to initiate some type of court action in order to get
such a determination. Furthermore, even if the opposing counsel is able
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to obtain such a determination from a court, it will be difficult for the
receiving attorney to forget the information that she has obtained from
the document's metadata concerning the leasing company's bottom line
with regard to monthly rental payments and the attorney's opinion on
the enforceability of the lease provision prohibiting large signs.
This last fact should provide attorneys with a strong incentive to put
in place procedures for removing metadata containing sensitive
information so that such information is not disclosed to opposing
counsel in the first place. The sending attorney could have scanned the
document into a PDF file or run the electronic document through a
scrubber program, either of which would have eliminated the
"Comments" attached to the document, prior to forwarding the
electronic version of the lease agreement to the receiving attorney. In
this manner, the preservation of the confidentiality of the client and
attorney communications lies with the party in the best position to
prevent its revelation and the actor with a clear duty to preserve such
confidentiality-the sending attorney.
V. CONCLUSION
As long as the attorney does not take extraordinary measures to
access metadata that opposing counsel has taken affirmative steps to
eliminate, an attorney should be allowed to view the metadata contained
in an electronic document forwarded by opposing counsel. No Model
Rule proscribes such conduct, and Model Rule 4.4(b) requires only that
the attorney inform opposing counsel upon discovery of sensitive
information in metadata that the attorney should realize was included
inadvertently. Furthermore, claims that the receiving attorney has a duty
to preserve the confidentiality of an opponent's information are illusory
at best, especially given that a good argument exists that the inclusion of
information in the metadata of a document waives any applicable
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine protection. Neither
does an attorney who views metadata without the use of extraordinary
measures engage in egregious conduct that violates a clearly established
norm of the legal profession. The use of new technologies in the
practice of law often require that attorneys change their patterns and
practices. Therefore, the common use of word processing software and
e-mail to create and transmit documents used in the practice of law now
necessitates that attorneys put procedures in place to ensure that
sensitive information is removed from the metadata prior to
transmission of electronic documents to the other side. If it is known
that the receiving attorney can view the metadata in electronic
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documents, sending attorneys will have a strong incentive to enact such
safeguards.

